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Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi:
American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of
Legal Education in India
by JAYANTH K. KRISHNAN*
On January 26, 1950 the Constitution of India came into effect.1
Nearly two and one-half years after winning independence from Britain,
India enacted one of the most detailed, rights-based constitutions ever
seen in the history of the world. 2 The passage of such a democratic consti-
tution was inspirational-not just for a country that endured centuries of
both informal and formal colonial rule, but also for those in the West.
Many American observers in particular looked on with awe as this eco-
nomically poor, yet fiercely independent nation sought to embrace politi-
cal and legal principles that had long been valued within the United
States. The Ford Foundation-one of the world's leading philanthropic
institutions based in the U.S.-soon also became infatuated with the
promise and overall "idea of India." 3 For Ford, India exhibited great
potential: its political and military leaders opted for democracy rather than
dictatorship; its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a dynamic,
Western-educated figure committed to economic development and mod-
ernization; and it retained English as a main national language, thereby
giving Americans, who so desired, a better opportunity to work more
*Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. J.D., Ohio State University;
Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Madison. For his mentorship and friendship over the years, I
am grateful to Marc Galanter, who provided me with such wonderful support as I wrote this
article. I also wish to thank Arthur von Mehren, David Clark, N.R. Madhava Menon,
Upendra Baxi, Bob Cole, Carolyn Elliott, Clark Cunningham, Bob Oliphant, and Ken
Gallant. Finally, special thanks to the Ford Foundation, which provided critical research
material for this article as well as to the officials and staff at the National Law School of
India (Bangalore), National Law Institute University (Bhopal), the National Judicial
Academy (Bhopal), and the NALSAR Law School (Hyderabad).
1. See Const. of India, 1950.
2. Today, the constitution has twenty-two parts, twenty-plus chapters, nearly four hun-
dred separate articles, an appendix (known as the section of schedules), and a set of direc-
tive, non-justiceable public policy principles. Embedded as well within the constitution,
within part three in particular, were the "fundamental rights" guaranteed to every Indian.
The broad categories that these fundamental rights covered included: the right to equality,
the right to freedom, the right against exploitation, the right to practice one's religion, cultur-
al and economic rights, the right to private property, and the right to constitutional remedies.
For a classic study on the passage of India's constitution, see GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1966). Also see P.M. BAKSHi, THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA WITH SELECTIVE COMMENTS (2000).
3. This term comes from StJNIL KnILNANI, THE IDEA OF INDIA (1998).
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easily within the country. 4 For these and other reasons, the Ford
Foundation began to take a serious interest in India.
One area that Ford especially focused on involved the development
of legal education. Policymakers at Ford Headquarters in New York as
well as at Ford's New Delhi office believed that for Indian democracy to
succeed, the country needed to have well-established, rule-based institu-
tions administered by those educated in the legal principles of equity, due
process, and individual rights. 5 These officials consulted with a number of
Indian legal elites, several of whom had studied in the United States, and
together these Americans and Indians concluded that law schools in India
would be the ideal place to promote such legal principles. After all, hav-
ing Indians educated in Western legal doctrine was critical for maintain-
ing Weberian, democratic institutions; and the hope was that this in turn
would lead to greater public respect for the rule of law.
Beginning in the 1950s, Ford thus began spending millions of dollars
and decades of energy working with Indians to create strong schools of
law. One of the first steps Ford took in its initiative was to hire a number of
respected American law professors as consultants. These academics were
charged with traveling to India, assessing the legal educational environ-
ment, and providing recommendations to both Ford and the government of
India for how to improve the country's legal education system. Given that
many of India's elite had routinely praised the American law school
model, Ford worked under the reasonable assumption that U.S. academics
would be in the best position to advise their Indian counterparts.
This assumption proved at best to be questionable. To date, no work
has presented the views of the academic consultants hired by Ford. For
decades these reports were confidential and the consultants were equally
reluctant to talk about their opinions. But perhaps because enough time
has passed and Ford's involvement in this area has waned, I was granted
access to all of Ford's documents on legal education in India. I also was
able to interview key American scholars who served as advisors to Ford.
This study traces the role American academics played in shaping Indian
legal education. As it shows, the belief held by both Ford and its Indian
partners that the American law school model could successfully be
exported to India soon came to be rejected by many of these U.S. profes-
sor-consultants. A consensus developed among these American acade-
mics that India's distinctive history, traditions, and legal profession-not
to mention its economic struggles and political climate-would make it
difficult for the American law school model to thrive in this environment.
And to their surprise, these consultants found that Indian legal scholars,
who were not affiliated with Ford, had their own innovative ideas on how
to improve the country's legal education system.
4. Author interview with an India-consultant to the Ford Foundation, Professor Marc
Galanter, January 20, 2004. Author interview with Dr. Carolyn Elliott, former Program
Officer, Ford Foundation, Delhi Office, April I, 2004.
5. Many who worked for Ford maintained this belief. The documentation of such atti-
tudes will be highlighted in the ensuing section.
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EARLY EVALUATIONS ON INDIAN LEGAL
EDUCATION: 1955-1960
In the years following World War II, many countries in the develop-
ing world began gaining their independence from their colonial rulers. In
1947 India and Pakistan gained independence. 6 One-year later Israeli
independence occurred.7 Later in the 1950s and 1960s, several countries
in Africa, Latin America, and other parts of Asia too became sovereign
nations. Several observers in the West saw these independent countries as
not only potentially new markets but also as hopeful environments where
democracy and the rule of law could thrive.
One institution that took a keen interest in the fast-moving events
occurring around the world was the Ford Foundation. The Ford
Foundation was "founded in 1936 ... operat[ing] as a local philanthropy
in the state of Michigan until 1950, when it expanded to become a nation-
al and international foundation." 8 (Thereafter the headquarters moved to
New York City.9) The main mission of Ford has been to provide grants
and loans to individuals, non-governmental organizations, businesses, and
governments for political, legal, social, cultural, and economic projects
that "promote peace, human welfare and the sustainability of the environ-
ment on which life depends."10
Over the years various interest groups and rights-based watchdogs have
expressed skepticism at Ford's work. For some, the Foundation has always
been tainted because Henry Ford-the founder, wealthy American automo-
bile capitalist, and well-documented anti-Semite--established this organiza-
tion. I I Others have suspected the Ford Foundation of practicing a new type of
colonialism-guaranteeing financial resources to needy countries in return
for promises to carry out the American political, legal, and economic
agenda.12 In response, the Ford Foundation notes that it is today an indepen-
dent institution with no ties to the Ford Motor Company. It also proudly
6. For a selected set of readings, see STANLEY WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA
(2003); KHILNANI, supra note 3; PAUL BRASS, THE POLITICS OF INDIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
(1994).
7. For a selected set of readings, see MARTIN GILBERT, ISRAEL (1998); HOWARD SACIIAR,
A HISTORY OF ISRAEL (1996); ARTHUR HERTZBERG, THE ZIONIST IDEA (1996).
8. See Ford Foundation Mission Statement: <http://www.fordfound.org/about/mission2.cfm>.
9. See Ford Foundation Website: <http://www.fordfound.org>.
10. See Ford Foundation Mission Statement: <http://www.fordfound.org/aboutlmission2cfm>.
I. For a selected sample of works discussing Fords anti-semitism, see NEIL BALDWIN,
HENRY FORD AND THE JEWS: THE MASS PRODUCTION OF HATE (2001); DOUGLAS BRINKLEY,
WHEELS FOR THE WORLD: HENRY FORD, HIS COMPANY, AND A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1903-
2003 (2003); MAX WALLACE, THE AMERICAN AXIS: HENRY FORD, CHARLES LINDBERGH, ADN
THE RISE OF THE THIRD REICH (2003).
12. See e.g., James Petras, The Ford Foundation and the CIA: A Documented Case of
Philanthropic Collaboration with the Secret Police, REBELLION, Dec. 15, 2001,
<http:/lwww.ratical.org/ratvillelCAHIFordFandCIAhtml>. Moreover, those who study in the
developing world know this sentiment is often expressed by different NGOs, business lead-
ers, and politicians.
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boasts that over the years it has donated nearly 12 billion dollars in grants and
loans for projects that it believes further its humanitarian mission. 13
In terms of promoting legal education, significant financial dona-
tions from Ford began as early as 1954. In that year the Foundation ear-
marked 12 million dollars to promote what it called "programs in interna-
tional studies."' 14 Nearly 7.5 million dollars of this money went to certain
American law schools to encourage the development of strong interna-
tional law curricula for students; to train foreign lawyers who came to the
U.S. to study; and to promote an environment where American academics
could research and specialize in international and comparative law.
15
Initially, five law schools were chosen as the testing sites for Ford's pro-
gram: Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, Stanford, and Berkeley.16 A year
later, the law schools at Yale and Chicago were also selected to partici-
pate. 17 Eventually, another 1.5 million dollars was donated to a "dozen or
so [other] law schools"18 to start international legal studies programs of
their own.19
But Ford did not only target U.S. law schools. Three million dollars
was allocated and equally divided to fund, for example, interchanges
between American and foreign bar organizations. Research grants for for-
eign scholars interested in studying international law in the U.S. were also
set aside. And money was allocated to develop "cooperative programs"
between U.S. law schools and law schools in Asia and Europe.20 These
cooperative programs ranged from promoting student exchanges to hav-
ing American academics advise foreign legal scholars on how to improve
legal education in their own countries. 2 1
One country that especially caught the attention of Ford policymak-
ers was India. As a signal that it wanted to help support this exciting new
democracy, Ford established an office in New Delhi in 1952.22 Early
13. See Ford Foundation Mission Statement: <http://www.fordfound.orgfaboutfmission2.cfm>.
14. Don Price, Special Report to the Officers: International Legal Studies, Oct. 26,1955
(report on file with author).
15. Id.
16. Id. Harvard was allocated $2,050,000, Columbia $1,500,000, Michigan $500,000,
Stanford $600,000 and Cal $300,000.
17. Id. In 1955, the Ford Foundation Board of Trustees approved a grant of $700,000 to
Yale and $1,175,000 to Chicago. The American Law Institute also received $300,000. And
during this first phase of funding, Duke University Law School received a $5,000 grant.
18- Id-
19. The other schools included: Cornell, Penn, NYU, SMU, Tulane, LSU, Texas, Duke,
George Washington, Georgetown, Virginia, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Nebraska, Indiana,
Illinois, Miami, Vanderbilt, and North Carolina. Note, Ford praised these schools for adroit-
ly recognizing that newly emerging nation-states viewed "U.S. concepts and experience of
constitutional government... as relevant to their own situations." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The countries of focus included Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, West Germany, and India.
22. Id. The Ford office in Delhi was run in a pyramid manner. The head of the office was
designated as the Representative. This Representative had one or two Deputy
Representatives (DR), and below the DRs were Program Officers, who then had staff
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memoranda among Ford officials indicate that they were particularly
impressed with how certain Indians, such as Dean Sivasubramanian of the
Delhi Law Faculty, 23 were keen about coming to the U.S. to learn more
about the American law school model. As one Ford official noted, "this
eminent Indian legal scholar is interested in studying American legal edu-
cation, promoting closer relations between American and Indian law
schools, and encouraging comparative studies in the constitutional law of
the two countries." 24 Ford clearly appreciated this enthusiasm; in 1955,
the Ford Delhi office convinced the New York headquarters to support
Dean Sivasubramanian for a one-year visit to the U.S., so that he could
travel the country and learn about American legal education. 25
Then in 1956, Ford tapped Stanford Law School Dean and compara-
tive law scholar, Carl B. Spaeth, to travel to India to assess the country's
legal education landscape. Spaeth was accompanied by Herbert Merillat, a
lawyer, independent writer, and historian who later went on to publish a
book on the Indian Constitution. 26 Spaeth and Merillat spent three weeks
in 1956 visiting New Delhi, Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay; they were
asked to report on what role Ford might play in helping to develop and
strengthen Indian law schools.27 From their writings, Spaeth and Merillat
discuss how rather than serving as advisors, their strategy from the outset
personnel below them. Initially the top leaders in the Delhi office were Americans, but over
time this has changed and the office has become much more "Indian" in composition.
(Today, the Representative himself is an Indian.)
23. Id. As I shall explain later, up until the mid 1980s, the term "law school" was not one
oft-used by Indians to describe legal educational institutions. A legal education institution in
India was generally known as a "law faculty." A student studying law at Delhi University,
thus, would say she is studying at the Delhi Law Faculty. Law faculties, like at Delhi
University, could award, in addition to the LL.B, LLM_ as well as Ph.D degrees. But as I will
explain, in some parts of the country (like Bombay), legal education institutions would be
referred to as "law colleges." These law colleges would award the LL.B. degree and basically
be autonomous institutions that fell under the auspices of a broad university structure. In these
systems, the university might also have something called "law departments." These law
departments would be places where students could pursue higher law degrees, such as an
LL.M. or Ph.D. Bombay University, which has several law colleges under it, also had a law
department as well. Throughout the course of this article, when I am generally talking
about-or describing the views Americans had of-Indian legal educational institutions, I
shall use the term "law school." However, when referring to specific institutions in India, I
shall use the appropriate names that those institutions referred to themselves as.
24. Id.
25. Id. According to Ford documents, Ford spent $11,600 to support Sivasubramanian for
that year.
26. See HERBERT CHRISTIAN MERILLAT, LAND AND TstE CONsTrrUTION IN INDIA (1970).
27. Spaeth and Merillat wrote-up three reports for Ford based on their mission to India.
The first two reports were drafts: See Carl B. Spaeth and H.C.L. Merillat, Legal Studies in
India, Draft of a Summary Report, Dec. 5, 1956 (unpublished document on file with author);
Carl B. Spaeth and H.C.L. Merillat, Legal Studies in India: A Summary Report of Spaeth-
Merillat Visit, Jan. 7, 1957 (unpublished document on file with author.) I will be referring to
both of these documents, but mainly to the final report: Can B. Spaeth and HC.L. Merillat,
Indian Legal Studies: Report on Spaeth-Merillat Visit, Feb. 1957 (unpublished document on
file with author) [hereinafter Spaeth-Merillat Visit, Final Report].
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was to conceptualize the "problems [of legal education] as seen by the
Indians and what Indians have done or are thinking of doing to meet these
problems." 28 Spaeth and Merillat were interested in being thought of as
students eager to learn from those working in the legal field as opposed to
presenting themselves as experts who possessed all the right answers.
29
As Spaeth and Merillat admit, they took this approach, in part, for
instrumental reasons. "We were well aware that a show of [Ford]
Foundation interest, evidenced by our visit, might distort real Indian inter-
ests and encourage plans not built on a solid Indian base."30 But aside from
wanting to avoid the perception of being characterized as the newest colo-
nial vanguard, a close inspection of the Spaeth-Merillat report reveals that
the authors had a genuine desire to learn from their hosts. For example,
they begin their evaluation of the Indian legal educational environment not
by offering their recommendations and observations but rather by quoting
from a long memorandum prepared by R.U. Singh, Dean at that time of the
Lucknow Law Faculty (located in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh.)
Singh cited a number of deficiencies within Indian legal educational insti-
tutions, including irregular times classes were held, low attendance rates
by students who faced little if any disciplinary action for missing classes,
poor testing methods by instructors, inadequate facilities, outdated curricu-
la, and second-rate instructors who were paid below-average salaries.
31
Spaeth and Merillat soon learned that other Indian academics and
lawyers also concurred with Singh's evaluation. But a disturbing senti-
ment Spaeth and Merillat found in their interviews with these legal educa-
tors was the "widespread skepticism" that anything could be done to
change the status quo.32 Required, according to the interviewees, was a
financial commitment from the central government to improve the
nation's law schools. Yet Indian lawyers and Indian judges at that time
were not favorably viewed by politicians. Politicians accused these two
groups of impeding the state's ability to grow and carry out its economic
and social policies. (Lawyers had won a series of court-cases challenging
the government's attempts to enhance its power.33) As such, Indian legal
educators saw little chance that the ruling Congress party would place the
reformation of the country's law schools as a high priority.34
In 1957, Spaeth and Merillat issued their final report. Rather than
28. See Spaeth-Merillat, Final Report, p. 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5-7.
32. Id. at 1o.
33. Professor S.P. Sathe has discussed this point at great length recently in a book on the
Indian judiciary. He argues that in a series of property law and economic policy cases, the
Indian courts attempted to place a check on the central government's growth, by striking
down Parliamentary-passed laws granting the government increased power to govern in
these areas. See S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA (2002). Also see MERILLAT, supra
note 26.
34. See Spaeth-Merillat, Final Report, supra note 27.
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making broad, sweeping recommendations, they argued for Ford to take
more measured, watchful steps. For instance, they called upon all Indian
law schools to confront the issues raised by Dean Singh.35 However,
instead of having Ford officials or other Westerners oversee whether law
schools were raising their standards, Spaeth and Merillat argued that an
Indian body-such as the All India Bar Association or independent com-
mission of Indian academics-be in charge. 36 Spaeth and Merillat also
proposed that before Ford offered its suggestions on how to improve the
Indian law school curriculum, it first should receive input directly from
Indian academics. 37 If it were to spend its money, Ford for now ought to
just support the establishment of research groups comprised of both
Indians and Americans who would work together on developing stronger
curriculums, particularly in the areas of statutory drafting and constitu-
tional law-the latter Indian scholars especially believed to be "the most
urgent field for study in terms of Indian needs and also the most promis-
ing field for comparative and cooperative work with scholars from the
United States and other countries." 38
In other words, Spaeth and Merillat thought it was unwise for Ford to
plunge into an environment where still so little was known about how
Indian legal education functioned. For example, Ford apparently earlier
indicated that it was interested in setting up an Indian national law institute,
modeled after the American Law Institute.39 Spaeth and Merillat though
urged caution before moving ahead with such a large project. What work
would be done at this institute and how would it improve legal education in
India? In what city would such an institute be located and would this cause
tension with other cities that lost out? How would Indian politicians react to
the creation of such a body? Would the institute be independent or affiliated
with a university? Who would its members be and who would staff the
institute? Perhaps because of their reservations a scaled-back, independent
Indian Law Institute was established in New Delhi in December of 1956
(with financial support from Ford). And although Spaeth and Merillat ulti-
mately conceded in their report that this body might be successful, they
continued to believe that it was important to ascertain the answers to these
questions before pressing ahead any further. 40
Spaeth and Merillat also expressed worry about Ford's apparent large-
35. Id. at 10- 12.
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id. at 16, 24-25. In terms of legislative drafting, Spaeth and Merillat emphasized that
this was an area that also needed immediate attention. Especially with the state growing
rapidly and increasing legislation being passed, they were told by their Indian hosts that this
was a key area that the lawyers of the day had little to no expertise in.
39. Id. at 17, [report stating that Ford had given "some encouragement" to Dean
Sivasubramanian that it was willing to help establish a research center (which earlier in the
report is the term used for the national law institute) that would be possibly connected to an
Indian university.].
40. See id. at 14-20. The spring 1958 issue of the Amencan Journal of Comparative Law
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scale plans to sponsor Indian lawyers to study in the U.S. For these
American consultants, such "wholesale training of Indian lawyers abroad"4 1
only made sense if what they learned in the U.S. could be practically used
in India. Not even a decade had passed since India gained independence;
Indians were still trying to grapple with how their legal system operated. To
inculcate Indian lawyers with American legal values without first under-
standing Indian needs, ran the risk of creating the perception that Ford was
simply promoting American propaganda. Spaeth and Merillat thus recom-
mended that Ford concentrate on sponsoring two groups of Indians to the
U.S.: academics (including judges) who could return to India after studying
the pluses (and minuses) of American legal education; and foreign-service
officers who could learn the theoretical and practical aspects of internation-
al law and diplomacy from American law professors.42
To illustrate to Ford the benefits of such a tightly focused exchange
program, upon his return to Stanford, Spaeth organized a five-week confer-
ence in Palo Alto during the summer of 1957, bringing together five Indians,
representing both of the above-mentioned groups, and four American law
professors. 43 In addition to the new relationships that developed and the rich
experience both the Americans and Indians gained from this intimate work-
ing session, the Stanford conference produced an important series of articles
focusing on "Comparative Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and
other fields relating to law and social change."44 The conference participants
had two goals for these papers. First, they hoped that the works might spur
researchers in India to delve further into one or more of these areas. Second,
they also wanted Indian legal educators to see the relevance of considering
legal problems in both a historic and comparative perspective, as well as in
terms of how law and public policy intersected.45
published a summary report of a one-year anniversary conference held by the ILI in
December 1957. As Professor Lawrence Ebb, another Stanford University academic inter-
ested in India, wrote: "the Final Report ... proposes that the Institute undertake research
projects in four areas of administrative law and in one major problem of constitutional law."
The AICL issue also contains an interesting note by Professor A.T. Markose of the
Trivandrum Law College (India) which contextualizes for the non-Indian specialist the polit-
ical and legal climate that existed at the time the ILl came into being. See Lawrence F. Ebb,
Conference of the Indian Law Institute, 7 AM. J. COMP. L. 219 (1958).
41. See Spaeth-Merillat, Final Report, supra note 27 at 23.
42. Id. at 23-24.
43. Spaeth convinced Ford to fund this program and a final report on this conference was
published by Stanford. See LAWRENCE F. EBB, PUBLIC LAW P ROBLEMS IN INDIA (1957). The
Indian participants included: Chandra Bhan Agarwal, former justice on the Allahabad High
Court; G.N. Joshi, Supreme Court lawyer and former Professor at Bombay Law College;
Prasanta Bheari Mukharji, a justice on the Calcutta High Court; S.M. Sikri, a governmental
lawyer from the state of Punjab; and Professor Pradyuma Tripath of Delhi Law School. The
American law professors included: Clark Byse (University of Pennsylvania); Lawrence F.
Ebb (Stanford Law School); Howard Mann (Indiana); and Nathaniel Nathanson
(Northwestern), and of course Carl Spaeth.
44. Id. at vi.
45. Id. at v-ix. Also reading through the fifteen different entries, this theme comes up
repeatedly.
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Rarely did Indian law teachers push their students to conceptualize
legal problems in this manner; rather the main way students learned was
through rote memorization of black-letter rules. For those meeting at the
Stanford conference, a key objective thus was to have Indian legal educa-
tors reconsider their traditional methods of education. In sum, the cooper-
ative results that came out of the 1957 Palo Alto meeting wonderfully rep-
resented what the Spaeth-Merillatt report sought to convey: that Ford's
enthusiasm for wanting to assist in the development of Indian legal educa-
tion needed to be balanced against how its efforts appeared to those it was
seeking to help. Simply arriving on the scene with large sums of money
and liberally doling out advice did little to address the structural problems
identified, for example, by Dean R.U. Singh. The best way to strengthen
Indian legal education would be through the deliberate and patient study
of Indian society and by Americans and Indians working together and
learning from one another-rather than by having the former serve as
"advisors" to the latter.
AN INDIAN GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL
EDUCATION
As Spaeth and Merillat discovered during their 1956 mission and
1957 conference, Indian legal elites were not reluctant to express their
ideas for how best to reform India's law schools. The year that Spaeth and
Merillat visited India, the central government's Law Commission-a state
board within the Ministry of Justice charged with proposing law reform
related legislation-began a study to revamp Indian legal education. 4 6
The Law Commission was not the first state-body to look at this issue. As
early as 1917, the British empowered Calcutta University to study how to
improve Indian law schools. 47 One year after independence, the
University Education Conmmission of 1948-1949 examined this subject;
and within the next five years three other separate commissions focused
on strengthening how law students were educated. 48 All of these commis-
sions noted that Indian legal education was in disarray; however, the 1956
Law Commission went the furthest in its criticism of how Indian law
schools functioned.
46. See MOTILAL CHIMANLAL SETALVAD AND LAW COMMISSION OF INDIA, REFORM OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1958) [hereinafter LAW COMMISSION]. Within this report there
were many subjects addressed by the Law Commission, legal education just being one of
them. The Law Commission of India dates back to the British Raj. The first Commission
was established in 1834 and charged with codifying the penal law. After independence, the
Commission has been in charge of proposing legislation that would comply with the
Constitution's non-justiceable, Directive Principles that mandate the state to bring about
legal, political, and solo-economic reform for all Indians. For a detailed discussion on the
Commission, see <http://www.lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/>.
47. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 46 at 520.
48. Id. (noting that the other committees were: the Bombay Legal Education Committee
of 1949; the All India Bar Committee of 1953; and the Rajasthan Legal Education
Committee of 1955.)
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The Law Commission issued a damning final report in 1958. It
declared that almost every aspect to law schools in India was "extremely
defective" and was "not calculated to produce either jurists or competent
legal practitioners." 49 The Commission, for example, disapproved of the
lack of uniformity in admissions. Some institutions, such as Delhi
University and Banaras Hindu University, required applicants to possess a
bachelors degree before entering, while others (such as Bombay
University) allowed graduating high school students to sit for the admis-
sions exam. 50 Indeed the latter was the practice in England and had been
in place in parts of India for some time.5' But drawing on the philosophy
of Roscoe Pound, the Commission believed that law was a difficult, com-
plex science and that the effective study of this subject could only be done
by those with intellectual maturity. 52 The Commission pointed to a previ-
ous Indian study that found "the best colleges of law [in the United States]
including Harvard, Columbia, Michigan, Chicago, California and others
require completion of a four-year degree course in Arts and[/or] Science
before admission to the law courses."53 Likewise the Commission
believed that only students with post-baccalaureate degrees and who
passed strict entrance exams should be eligible for admission. 54
The Commission went on to call for other changes. While the dura-
tion of legal education-which at this time was two years-was deemed
appropriate, the curriculum was not. The Commission argued that stu-
dents should be subjected to rigorous scientific, theoretical, and doctrinal
training in law. 55 (Interestingly, aside from jurisprudence, the
Commission did not spell out what other specific courses should
be offered to meet this objective.) It emphatically recommended that
49. Id. at 548.
50. Id. at 526. In India, the system of high school education generally works as follows:
Students matriculate after what is called the 10th standard. Then they do two years of "pre-
university" schooling. After completing this "10 plus two" requirement, they then are free to
apply to colleges/universities. At the time of the Commission's report, students could apply
directly to some law programs, like at Bombay University, following the completion of their
high school education.
51. Since 1938, law could be taken as an undergraduate major. Interestingly, up till that
point at some Indian law schools (like Bombay University), "admission to the degree course
in law was . . . open only to graduates in arts, science or other subjects." See LAW
COMMISSION, supra note 46 at 526. But after the Report of Legal Education Reforms
Committee of 1935, which found that allowing post-high school students to take law as an
undergraduate course would be most efficient and economical, most law schools abandoned
the prerequisite of an undergraduate degree before studying law.
52. See id. at 521 [noting that "the absence of juristic thought and publications in our
country is no doubt due, in part, to our defective system of legal education which fails to rec-
ognize the study of law as a branch of learning and as a science."]
53. The study cited by the Commission was issued by the 1948-149 University Education
Commission. See LAW COMMISSION, supra note 46 at 529.
54. Id. at 530-31; 539.
55. Id. at 531-33. The Commission argued that the traditional practice of teaching Roman
law should be abandoned and that a jurisprudence course was a must for students to take
during their second year.
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procedural and more practical-based courses not be part of the two-year
curriculum. 56 Practical training in law schools, including moot court
courses and competitions, had only furthered the perception that legal
education was vocational rather than academic in nature.57
The Commission even rejected the idea that practitioners be allowed
to serve as adjunct professors. Law faculties needed to be staffed with
full-time people who saw teaching as a profession unto itself.
Traditionally, Indian law faculties were filled with practicing lawyers who
would rush to the classroom after a busy workday and show up unpre-
pared to teach. This prevalence of adjuncts contributed to the dearth of
academic scholarship from law faculties, much to the dismay of the
Commission. Part-time teachers were perpetuating an already "grievously
backward" 58 legal education system, and their "haphazard and cursory
methods of teaching" 59 demeaned the educational process as well as dis-
served students. The Commission pointed to the United States where pro-
fessional teachers appreciated and recognized the value and time-commit-
ment involved in perfecting pedagogy; American law professors had suc-
cessfully developed a combinational technique of teaching-using lec-
tures, case-law, and the Socratic method, and the Commission recom-
mended Indian law school teachers follow this approach. 60 Hence,
adjuncts had to be replaced immediately if Indian legal education was to
move forward.
Although the Commission sought to make the legal educational
environment more scholarly, it recognized that most law graduates would
not enter academia but instead pursue a professional career in law. The
Commission therefore argued that after law graduates completed the two
years of "scientific" legal education, the Indian Bar Council-not Indian
law faculties-would be responsible for providing courses on the practical
aspects of the profession.61 Concurrently, these aspiring practitioners
would be asked to "apprentice" under the tutelage of an established
lawyer for a period of one year.62 The Commission acknowledged that the
type of work asked of the apprentice might vary. Some might serve as a
researcher in a lawyers office; some might regularly appear in court on
behalf of the lawyer; or some might do a mixture of the two.63 For the
Commission, the lawyer and the Bar Council could determine the nature
of the apprenticeships; the key point was that legal education would
remain an intellectual and scientific endeavor.
56. Id. at 531.
57. Id. at 531-33.
58. Id. at 534.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id. at 533-34.
61. Id. at 543-548
62. Id. at 547; 550.
63. Id. at 547.
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A year after the Law Commission issued its report, Ford's Delhi
office (upon approval from New York) in 1959 called upon Stanford's
Carl Spaeth again to return to India.64 This time Ford (Delhi) asked
Spaeth to spend four months collecting information on the extent to which
Indian legal education had changed since he completed his mission three
years prior. Ford was hoping that Spaeth might deliver a firm set of policy
recommendations for how it should execute its plan of helping to establish
solid legal educational institutions in India. Once again, however, Spaeth
reported to Ford that the notion of an outsider making such bold recom-
mendations was unwise. As he stated in his memo:
I [have] found the task much more difficult, much more complex, th[a]n I had
anticipated. I am aware that on some issues I have not got all the essential facts. I
have leamt that a study of Indian legal education compels consideration of a large
complex of political, social, cultural, and economic issues that mark the present
period of India's history and development.... At any rate, a growing awareness
of many lines of uncompleted inquiry have made me reluctant to submit either an
analysis or a diagnosis.65
Consequently, Spaeth stated that any recommendations were at best
"tentative and require[d] . . . additional study"; 66 his proposals thus were
reflections, general thoughts, and impressions on what might be done in
order to improve the current state of affairs. During his extended stay,
Spacth interviewed judges, lawyers, academics, politicians, and students;
he also conducted on-site inspections of fifteen different law schools
throughout the country. 67 But as he highlights at the outset of his report,
the 1958 findings of the Law Commission as well as the recommenda-
tions of those bodies that preceded the Commission greatly influenced his
views on this subject.68
For example, Spaeth reaffirmed past Commission-findings that
Indian legal education was in a dismal state. "Although for many years
high-level commissions have been reporting the sad condition of legal
education, the condition seems to get worse and not better." 69
Furthermore, Spaeth also concluded-as the 1958 Law Commission
report had-that the training and examination of law students lacked
any real analytical and theoretical rigor.70 He believed as well that
64. See Carl B. Spaeth, Memorandum on Indian Legal Education, March 1960 [here-
inafter Spaeth 1960.
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id. at 12.
67. See id. Also see supra note 23. Spaeth, throughout his report, refers to law faculties,
law colleges, and law departments-technically three types of Indian legal educational insti-
tutions-as "law schools." In describing Spaeth's views on these institutions, I thus shall do
the same.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2.
70. See id. at 5 [noting that "The idea of professional training that begins with a thorough
grounding in theory and history, analysis and synthesis, and moves to sophisticated study of
complex and legal problems but does not include law office and court house practice is
almost totally unknown."] Also see id. at 13-16.
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admissions-tests ought to be more stringent and that a baccalaureate
degree, like the Commission recommended, should be a prerequisite.7'
And he expressed disappointment that Indian law schools continued to
lack a clear vision on curriculum and pedagogy.72
But Spaeth did not simply parrot all of the recommendations made
by the Law Commission. He raised several issues that this body did not
address. For one thing, Spaeth thought it was important to understand why
only "10 to 15% of the thousands of law graduates go into 'actual prac-
tice."' 73 That such a seemingly small number of law graduates were
deriving economic benefits through "actual practice", he believed, had a
"direct bearing [not just on the financial sector] but also on the policies
and plans for legal education of the future."74 In addition, Spaeth noted
that reformers of legal education had to be sensitive to the tensions over
caste, language, and university-bureaucratic politics-all which played a
role in: who were admitted as students; who were hired as law teachers;
and who gained employment after graduation.75
And at one point in his report, Spaeth even challenges the Law
Commission's curricular recommendations. Spaeth argued that Indian
legal education should be three years, and that academic administrators
ought to emphasize both theory and practice within the curriculum. 76
"The division of subjects into the categories "theoretical" and "practical",
the former assigned to the universities, and the latter to the Bar Councils,
is artificial and unreal." 77 Very interestingly, though, Spaeth supported his
argument not by pointing to the U.S. law school model as the archetype,
but instead by relying on a report issued by the 1953 All India Bar
Conference. 78 Of course, the Bar may have possessed self-interested
motivations for not wanting to take on the formal responsibility of solely
training the country's law graduates. But that Spaeth turned to this Indian
report, rather than to the U.S. law school model as the basis of his argu-
ment, illustrates a recognition that Indians were contemplating different
approaches for improving legal education years before Ford began send-
ing Americans to India. Perhaps not surprisingly then, Spaeth's final
report to the Foundation reiterated a theme he stressed in 1956: that
American legal education consultants avoid playing the role of "advisors"
and instead be willing to serve as collaborators and even as students who
71. Id. at 9-13.
72. Id. at 3-5.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. id. at 6-9.
76. Id. at 19 [noting that "subjects like Procedure and Taxation should be integrated with
the first two years of instruction.... In a legal system built in large measure on the authority
of judicial precedent the lawyer should be trained from a very early point in his student days
to undcrstand the procedural setting from which the court, whether trial or appellate,
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could learn much from their Indian counterparts.
FORD'S FIRST MAJOR FORAYS INTO CHANGING INDIAN
LEGAL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
While Carl Spaeth was Ford's main consultant on Indian legal edu-
cation in the 1950s, during the 1960s the Foundation turned to Harvard
law professor Arthur von Mehren to continue studying this issue. 79 At that
time Professor von Mehren was one of the U.S.'s most respected authori-
ties on comparative and international law. From August 7, 1962 to June
11, 1963, von Mehren lived in India working for Ford, where he was
charged with assessing how the Indian Law Institute was functioning, as
well as reporting to Ford on the state of the country's bar association,
court-system, and legal educational institutions. 80 Von Mehren's June
1963 report to Ford was admittedly "very critical of India."8 l This
resource-poor, caste-conscious society, von Mehren concluded, remained
glued to non-egalitarian customs that prevented serious social progress
from taking place.8 2 A dynamic, rational legal system based on equality
and individual liberty and governed by fair rules and procedures simply
could not thrive in this environment because the vast majority of Indians
refused to abandon their "static" traditions. 83
Von Mehren hypothesized that the reason so much of the mass popu-
lation failed to embrace a Weberian-type legal system was because "the
law on the books [in India] is, in good part, typically not an indigenous
product." 84 The British of course had imposed their colonial legal system,
and this was followed by the 1950 Constitution, which although drafted
by an Indian Constituent Assembly, still in many ways looked like a very
Western document-(perhaps not surprisingly given that many players at
the Assembly were Western educated. 85) Moreover, lawyers and judges
who worked within the legal system were viewed by the general populace
as perpetuators of this non-applicable foreign species. 86 Von Mehren thus
believed that in order for Indian society to begin accepting the democratic
rule of law as legitimate, the laws themselves had to be written by Indians
educated within India. Since lawyers by their professional nature had a
79. Carl Spaeth stepped down as Dean of Stanford Law School in 1962 and decided to
scale back his involvement in India.
80. See Arthur von Mehren, Aspects of Legal Scholarship and Education in India,
Confidential Memo to Ford Foundation, 1963.
81. See id. at 19.
82. See id. at 7-8.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. For the classic treatment of the drafting of the Indian Constitution, see GRANVILLE
AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION (1969).
86. See von Mehren, supra note 80 at 8 [noting that "in societies in which the law in the
books does not reflect fairly accurately the society's accepted values, the lawyer tends to be
looked upon as a manipulator."]
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predilection towards statutes and regulations, they were in a position to
make an enormous impact. But the institutions where lawyers were taught
their skills needed to be serious places of learning. As he stated to Ford:
In my judgment, the most promising-indeed probably the only potentially
decisive-key to the problem [of India's lack of legal and socio-economic devel-
opment] is legal education. .. [L]egal education, by shaping the men and minds
that will address themselves to the problems of law, offers the best-probably the
only substantial-hope of accelerating, and consciously assisting, the process.87
Like Spaeth (whom he cited in his report to Ford88), von Mehren
believed that having Indians involved was integral to strengthening legal
education. And according to von Mehren, beginning in the 1960s Ford, to
its credit, started to accept this point.89 When the University of Delhi
established a committee in April of 1963 to study how to improve the
Delhi Law Faculty and invited von Mehren to sit as the only non-Indian
member, Ford viewed this as an opportunity for it to learn about legal
education from an Indian perspective. 90
Not surprisingly, von Mehren as well expressed excitement at the
chance to participate on this committee. 91 Staffed by six members (includ-
ing von Mehren), 92 the Gajendragadkar Committee as it soon became
called, 93 sought to provide "recommendations for improving legal educa-
tion" 94 at Delhi University and at the other institutions in the country.
Similar to the findings of the 1958 Law Commission, the Gajendragadkar
Committee conceded that Indian legal education was in a horrendous
state.95 And like its predecessor, the Committee recommended: raising
admissions standards and making a baccalaureate degree a pre-requisite for
entrance; 96 improving teaching quality and testing methods; 97 hiring only
87. Id. at 9-10.
88. Id. at 16-17.
89. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. The other committee members were: Justice P,B. Gajendragadkar (Chair); P.N.
Sapru, a member of the upper house of Parliament; S.V. Gupta, Additional [Assistant]
Solicitor General of India; Dr. Anandjee, Principal, Law College Banaras; and Professor M.
Ramaswamy, Dean, Delhi Law School. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE RE-
ORGANISATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DELHI (1964).
93. This committee was so named after its chair, Supreme Court Justice P.B.
Gajendragadkar.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. at 1-6.
96. Id. at 6-10.
97. Id. at 10-24. The Committee, in discussing how to improve law teaching, cited the
debate between Roscoe Pound (who favored the case method approach) and Morris Cohen,
who believed that teachers should focus more on social reasoning and social policy than on
the importance of precedent. The Committee also cited Harlan Fiske Stone's views that law
has to be thought of in terms of socio-economic policy. Ultimately, the Committee opted not
to adopt any particular approach and instead stated that Indian law teachers needed to exper-
iment and find the method that most challenged and energized how students were taught.
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dedicated, full-time faculty interested in scholarly publishing;98 and
constructing "a well-furnished library." 99
The tone of the Gajendragadkar Report was openly critical of how
Indian legal education had functioned since Independence.100 According
to von Mehren, that this criticism came from an almost completely Indian
body was noteworthy. 101 With much of the Indian legal elite recognizing
how badly legal educational institutions operated, von Mehren's sugges-
tions and criticisms were generally not viewed as colonialist-meddling but
as only supplementing the conventional wisdom. 102 When von Mehren
reported to Ford that: the quality of Indian law students was low; law
teachers often were incompetent; facilities were shoddy; and so on, he felt
confident that this assessment would be supported by people such as
Justice Gajendragadkar and other Indians who had been working on
improving legal education.103 In fact, in 1966 von Mehren completed an
updated critique of the Delhi Law Faculty, reiterating many of his earlier
comments. But this time he had as his co-authors Bertram Willcox, a
Cornell Law School professor that Ford hired to work in India, and P.K.
Tripathi, Delhi Law Faculty's own dean.104
For von Mehren, Ford needed to foster cooperative relationships
with the Indians, such as engaging people like Tripathi to work alongside
the Americans; only then could there be any hope for improving the cur-
rent state of affairs. Certainly the U.S. scholars brought to the table a great
deal of expertise on legal education; but without Indian assistance even
the best American advice would not go far. And the Ford Foundation
seemed now to understand this point.105 In 1964 von Mehren helped
convince Ford officials in New York to make their first substantial
98. Id. at 24-29.
99. Id. at 29. In making this recommendation, the Committee drew upon Justice Robert
Jackson's views that a good library was the lifeblood of a productive law faculty.
100. One member of the Committee, Professor M. Ramaswamy of the University of
Delhi, dissented from the Committee's set of recommendations. Although Ramaswamy
believed that law schools in India needed extensive overhauling, he disagreed with several
of the majority's recommendations. For example, Ramaswamy called for a different curricu-
lar emphasis than the majority. He also believed in adhering to the lecture method of teach-
ing and to the current system of having exams at the end of the final year, rather than at the
end of each semester-as proposed by the majority. And he argued, contrary to the majori-
ty's view, that the teaching loads of law faculty be reduced. See id. at 38-73.
101. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004.
102. Id.
103. See generally von Mehren, supra note 80.
104. See Arthur von Mehren, P.K. Tripathi, and Bertram F. Willcox, Discussion Paper:
Proposals Respecting the Delhi Law Faculty, Ford Foundation, August 1966.
105. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004. Also see a later
memo written by Douglas Ensminger (Lead Ford Foundation official working on legal edu-
cation in India), Memorandum, February 13, 1967 [noting the importance for building and
maintaining cooperative ties with the Indians.] This memo is addressed to Dean Tripathi, as
well as to the Director of the Indian Law Institute, Dr. G.S. Sharma, and to Dean Anandjee,
Dean of the Banaras Hindu Law Faculty. I will be discussing Anandjee's impact on Ford
Foundation policy and Indian legal education in a moment.
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investment in an Indian university. Rather than granting what eventually
was over a half million dollars to the seemingly obvious choice, Delhi
University, Ford-New York, upon von Mehren's recommendation and the
recommendation of its own representative in Delhi, chose the Banaras
Hindu University (BHU) Law Faculty in Uttar Pradesh as its recipient. 106
Many in India were surprised by Ford's choice. Banaras was an eco-
nomically poor, inaccessible city with serious caste and language tensions
among the population. 107 The university struggled for resources, and the
number of potentially impressive students was much lower than in Delhi.
Furthermore, the law faculty at BHU was not well-reputed, and there was
little optimism that new scholars were on the horizon.108 However, due to
university and law faculty politics, the Delhi campus (unlike Banaras) was
at least two years away from implementing the recommendations of the
Gajendragadkar Committee-which included shifting from a two-year to
three-year law program, an especially important condition for Ford.' 0 9
Eventually in 1967 Delhi received a Ford grant," 10 but even had Delhi
been ready in 1964, BHU retained one important advantage: the presence
of Dean Anandjee, an academician with whom von Mehren worked on
the Gajendragadkar Committee and someone he perceived to be an ambi-
tious, charismatic, innovative leader who had the deftness to make sub-
stantive changes in Indian legal education. III
Indeed Arthur von Mehren had great hopes for Dean Anandjee.
Anandjee was a leading scholar and teacher of labor law and jurispru-
dence.11 2 He also was well-connected to politicians and judges and was
highly respected within the Bar Council of India. People saw Anandjee as
a real "doer," but as von Mehren recently commented, ultimately the
political, social, and economic obstacles existing at Banaras Hindu
University proved too great for even someone of Anandjee's abilities to
overcome.11 3 Von Mehren based this retrospective conclusion not just on
his own observations but on those described by subsequent U.S. acade-
mics that Ford hired to visit BHU during the 1960s. Between July 1966
106. According to id., Ford made a $240,000 grant to Banaras Hindu University (BHU)
in 1964 and then a $304,000 grant to BHU in 1967. The Ford representative in Delhi was a
Dr. CD. Deshmukh.
107. See Arthur von Mehren, Confidential Report to Ford Foundation, January 17, 1970.
108. Id.
109. See Ensminger, supra note 105 at 3. The situation at Delhi University (D.U.) indeed
was tense, and this made Ford-Delhi nervous to recommend to Ford-New York that D.U.
receive the first grant. For example, there was great inter-departmental rivalry, constant
strikes by students, faculty dissention within the law school, and a university administration
that remained divided over whether to accept Ford money. See id, Also see Arthur von
Mehren, Final Report to Ford, supra note 107.
110. Id.
11. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004; also see von Mehren,
Final Report to Ford, supra note 107.
112. See Upendra Baxi, Professor Pradyuruma Kumar Tripathi: A Tribute (2001) 5 SCC
(Jour) 1, http://www.ebc-india.comllawyerarticles/200lv5al.htm. [hereinafter Baxi, A Tribute]
113. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004.
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and February 1967, Ford asked Georgetown University Law Centers
Kenneth Pye to take stock of BHU's law program.11 4 Like von Mehren,
Pye was very impressed with Anandjee. Anandjee, according to Pye, had:
excellent ideas and is a first rate politician both within the University and with
the U.G.C. [University Grant Commission.]I50 He has a deep personal dedication
to the future of the Law School. I have met no one else who could have achieved
as much as he has accomplished thus far at Banaras. 16
Yet Pye also found many serious problems present at BHU. "Library
facilities were completely inadequate,"' 17 courses did not have syllabi,
faculty aptitude varied greatly, and basic features such as copying
machines were not available. In addition, there were pedagogical issues:
because there were no textbooks available, the only information students
received on subjects they were studying would be from the (often dry)
lectures of their professors. 118 Add to this that the "quality of the students
... [was] extremely low," 119 which made the education process both dif-
ficult and frustrating for professors and contributed to weak morale
among the faculty. 120
These major hurdles facing BHU left Pye with "substantial doubts
that anyone can build a law school of international excellence at
Banaras."121 But he was not without any hope. Although Ford had donat-
ed nearly a quarter of a million dollars to BHU, more funding directed at
improving the deficiencies he cited would give the school the best chance
for succeeding.122 It is true Pye believed that Ford's financial commit-
ment needed to be tied to some tangible changes at BHU. However, more
importantly for him was that Ford clarify to the Indians that its American
consultants were in India only to "assist in the improvement of the legal
114. See A. Kenneth Pye, Progress Report on Grant to Law College, Banaras Hindu
University: 8 July, 1966--6 February, 1967. (Memorandum to Dr. Douglas Ensminger, Ford
Foundation.) [hereinafter Pye, 1967 Memo]. In 1968, Pye became Dean at Duke Law School.
115. See id. at 6. The University Grant Commission is a central governmental body
responsible for overseeing how institutions of higher learning in India operate, administra-
tively, financially, and educationally. Among other things, the UGC makes recommenda-
tions to the central and state govemments on the type of funding institutions of higher leam-
ing should receive. See http://www.ugc.ac.in/.
116. See id. at 6.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 19. Also see A. Kenneth Pye, Status of the Grant to Banaras Hindu University
Law College, April 27, 1969 (Ford Foundation Memorandum) [hereinafter Pye, 1969
Memo].
119. Pye, 1967 Memo, supra note 114 at 16.
120. Id. at 16; Pye 1969, supra note 118, at 5-6-
121. Pye, 1967 Memo, supra note 114 at 23 [noting, however, that if anyone could
reform the system, "Dr. Anandjee is the man."]
122. One reason the $240,000 was not proving to be enough was because in order to
acquire even the most basic of library-collections, according to Pye, ncarly $100,000 would
have to be spent. If BHU hoped to do other things, such as attract strong faculty or build
quality dorms for students, more funding would be needed. See Pye, 1967 Memo, supra note
114at 10-12.
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education and legal process"t 23-rather than to devise a specific
(Western) formula for their hosts to follow. Perhaps for this reason, Pye
was emphatic that BHU work with other institutions in the country, such
as the Delhi Law Faculty and Indian Law Institute, as a means of building
a true Indian legal community.12 4
It seems as though Pye's message made an impression on policy-
makers at Ford. Just five days after receiving Pye's memo, Douglas
Ensminger, Ford's top representative in Delhi, addressed a letter to Dean
Anandjee as well as to Dean P.K. Tripathi of the Delhi Law Faculty and
G.S. Sharma, the Director of the Indian Law Institute (1LI).125 Ensminger
proposed bringing these three Indian educators together for a one-day
seminar in March of 1967 in order to foster inter-institutional cooperation
and to devise strategies to improve the educational quality at Delhi and
Banaras.126 It is unclear whether this meeting ever took place; Ford did
not provide documentation regarding this proposed seminar. However,
Ford did ask its subsequent American consultants to study: a. the likeli-
hood that the three institutions would meet regularly to discuss issues con-
cerning improving legal education; and b. whether a coordinated effort
among these institutions would in fact lead to such improvement. 127
Professor Bertram Willcox from Cornell Law School was the first to
report back to Ford on these two questions. Willcox had been in India
working for Ford, on-and-off, for nearly four years.' 28 By 1967 Willcox
knew the Indian legal educational landscape arguably as well as anyone in
the country. Unlike Pye, he doubted that bringing together the heads of
the ILI and the Banaras and Delhi law faculties would lead to constructive
discourse that then could be translated into bettering the Indian legal edu-
cation model.1 29 For Willcox, the main problems inhibiting such coopera-
tion were the internal politics present at each of the institutions, and per-
haps surprisingly, his view that the respective leaders were really not all
that capable. 130
For example, the ILI suffered, according to Willcox, because neither
Director Sharma nor his predecessor, M.P. Jain, knew how to manage
123. Id. at 21.
124. Id. at 20-22.
125. See Ensminger, supra note 105. Recall, the ILl was established to serve as the major
legal Indian think-tank for those interested in producing scholarly publications and fine-tun-
ing their pedagogical techniques. By 1967, however, the ILl was viewed by the American
consultants as a second rate institution, with few true scholars serving as fellows and little
attention given to teaching.
126. Id. at 3.
127. I shall be discussing the reports of these consultants' findings forthwith.
128. See Bertram Willcox, Confidential Terminal Report, Sept. 1. 1967 (Memo to Ford
Foundation.) Willcox first went to India in 1963. While he was there he helped the faculties
at Banaras and Delhi Law Schools develop labor law courses and casebooks. And he also
established training sessions on teaching at the Indian Law Institute between 1963-1965.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2-13.
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staff or breed cooperation among those within the institution. Both men
practiced favoritism and ruled by decree rather than by consensus; as a
result they had little legitimacy among their colleagues. 13 1 Willcox found
similar leadership problems to exist within the two law faculties. At
Delhi, Willcox viewed Dean P.K. Tripathi as "an aloof and unsympathetic
dean-tyrant."1 32 And at Banaras, although WilLcox saw Dean Anandjee
as a nice person, he nonetheless characterized Anandjee as an ineffective
leader with a chronic tendency to procrastinate and to leave important
decisions unmade. 133
Indeed several other Ford consultants after Willcox came to similar
conclusions. Ford had hired a group of ambitious American legal acade-
mics to visit India during the late 1960s. For example, Professors Julius
Getman and John H. Jackson each spent time at the ILI.13 4 Harry W.
Jones, Kenneth L. Penegar, and Arthur W. Murphy each spent months at
Delhi University. 135 And C. Dallas Sands was at Banaras for a significant
period during 1968.136 Along with citing problems of leadership, the con-
sultants reiterated other challenges that continued to hobble these centers
of learning. Insufficient resources, low quality staff, students, and schol-
ars, weak library facilities, and poor physical infrastructure were just
some of the hurdles that the ILI and Delhi and Banaras law campuses con-
tinued to face.137
But in reviewing each of these reports a common theme that once
again emerges is that of the American professors urging Ford to remain
sensitive to the fact that India was not the United States; it was thus unfair
to measure and evaluate the progress of Indian legal educational institu-
tions through a Western institutional lens. Harry Jones, for example,
131. As Wilcox reports: "Dr. M.P. Jain showed real ability in many ways. He is one of
the best legal scholars in India. But as an administrator he fostered factionalism and discon-
tent. He was hampered, to be sure, by [his] judge-rule [behavior], and he certainly lacked
needed authority. Dr. Gyan Sharma obtained that authority, but then proceeded to abuse it
through pride of place, shiftiness, and arbitrary and dictatorial rule." (Id. at 13.)
132. Id. at 14. Although this characterization is quite at odds with how an Indian col-
league and prominent Indian academic viewed Tripathi. See Baxi, A Tribute, supra note
112.
133. Willcox reports: "Dean Anandjee does not get things done, and he does not dele-
gate," and that he is unable to act in a politically savvy manner to deal with those who may
be angered at difficult decisions that need to be made. Id.
134. See Julius Getman, End of Tour Report, June 12, 1968 (Memo to Ford Foundation);
John H. Jackson, Short Reflections on the Indian Law Institute, May 6, 1969 (Memo to Ford
Foundation.)
135. See Harry W. Jones, Observations and Impressions of Delhi University Faculty of
Law, May 7, 1968 (Memo to Ford Foundation.); Kenneth L. Penegar, End of Assignment
Report, July 11, 1968 (Memo to Ford Foundation.); Arthur W. Murphy, Developments in
Legal Education at Delhi University, Implications for India and Recommendations, June 9,
1970; (Memo to Ford Foundation.)
136. See C. Dallas Sands, Terminal Report from Banaras, June 1, 1968 (Memo to Ford
Foundation.). Note, Julius Getman also spent time in Banaras and describes his visit in his
report, see supra note 134.
137. See supra notes 131-133.
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warned that because "the difficulties here are so great .. the Foundation
and its legal consultants should be prepared to find satisfaction in relative-
ly small gains and to grant time and patient understanding" to those in
India with whom they are working.138 In addition, the consultants repeat-
ed that Ford's funding of legal educational reforms might by perceived as
the latest form of Western colonization. As Jones goes on to say:
"[Miany Indian scholars, including a good number of the most distinguished, are
somewhat uneasy about the American presence in Indian universities and appre-
hensive that our visits to Indian law faculties may result in what is sloganized
here as the "Americanization" of Indian legal education.... We can describe our
model for our Indian colleagues, and report our successful and unsuccessful
experience with it for such guidance that may provide for Indian education
reform, but effective legal education in India, in the last analysis, must reflect
Indian cultural conditions and distinctively Indian genius."1 39
Jones' advice to Ford was echoed by others. Dallas Sands, who spent
time at Banaras, reported to Ford that he perceived his (Western) presence
on campus as "inhibit[ing] free discussion"140 among his Indian colleagues.
Sands stated that in addition to the many institutional problems facing
Banaras, Ford needed to recognize that "an outsider is not the best one to
push an idea of ... [educational reform] in the Indian system."141 In his
report describing his visit to Banaras as well as to the ILI, Julius Getman
conceded that he was all but dismissed by officials from both institu-
tions. 142 And during his stay at Delhi University, Kenneth Penegar also
stated that he felt an "element of resentment towards outside influence."143
By the end of the 1960s policymakers in Ford's New Delhi office
began seriously to reconsider whether in fact the American law school
model could thrive in India. The evaluations from their consultants
detailed the many Herculean obstacles that existed within the Indian envi-
ronment. Still each of these consultants maintained hope that with suffi-
cient funding and continued patience Ford's goal could succeed.144 In
1971, however, Ford received the most critical assessment of its program
138. Jones, supra note 135 at 1. Also see Arthur Murphy's comments, supra note 135 at
33, noting that "India should not automatically follow the American pattern of undifferentiated
law schools training "generalists.' (id. at Appendix 3). Also see Murphy arguing that "at some
point the United States formula becomes wasteful and even, to some extent, self defeating" for
India to follow." (Id. at 33).
139. Id. at 10.
140. Sands, supra note 136 at 11.
141. Id. at 15. (Sands, in fact, goes on to say that "from a professional standpoint I was
mostly wasting my time this year, and there is not really much gratification in the feeling
that I have been learning a great deal more (about India) than I have been contributing pro-
fessionally." Id. at 20).
142 Getman, supra note 134 at 2-7.
143. Penegard, supra note 135 at 12. Although Penegard noted that this resentment was
found less among law faculty and more among faculty from other university departments.
144. In fact, see Arthur von Mehran's final memo to Ford on this subject discusses how
the next "five years or so should give a basis for assessing" all that has been done with
respect to legal education in India. (Jan. 17,1970).
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to date. The report from this particular consultant ultimately led to the end
of Ford's legal education work in India.
BOALT HALL'S ROBERT COLE AND HIS EVALUATION OF
FORD'S PROGRAM
In 1971 California law professor Robert Cole traveled to India to
provide a status report to Ford. 145 Seven years had passed since Ford
made its first grant to the Banaras Law Faculty.146 Given the critical
assessments of its previous consultants, the New Delhi and New York
offices were interested in having a thorough evaluation done on its pilot
program in Banaras. Ford thus asked Cole to spend nearly eight months in
India, scrutinizing the Banaras law campus and then surveying the overall
landscape of legal education in the country.147 Cole produced the most
detailed report Ford had received on this subject to date. Spanning sixty-
five single-spaced pages and covering dozens of interrelated issues, Cole
offered a number of "negative criticisms" 148 on the direction in which
Indian legal education was moving as well as on Ford's current program.
Cole argued that Ford needed to look beyond what was occurring
inside Indian legal educational institutions. For example, the functioning
of-and opportunities provided by-the Indian bar, according to Cole, was
directly impacting legal education in "profound and adverse" ways. 149 Most
lawyers were struggling solo practitioners who only knew one thing: litiga-
tion.150 Lawyers rarely engaged in transactional practice or public interest
service; such work was done by other actors who tended (negatively) to
view lawyers as courtroom specialists only to be called on when litigation
could not be avoided.151 Furthermore, few if any law graduates per year
landed a good-paying job as an apprentice with a practicing lawyer.152 And
Cole had collected data suggesting that a significant percentage of law
graduates opted not to pursue a career in law. 153 "Of course, it does not
145. See Robert H. Cole, Observations on Legal Education in India, End of Tour Report,
Sept. 14, 1971 (Memo to Ford),
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1-2.
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id. at 6-9.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2-9.
153. For example, Cole cites a study done by Professor Marc Galanter noting "that while
the number of enrolled advocates increased by 3,000 between 1952 and 1958 (or 500/year),
the number of graduates holding law degrees increased by 37,000." Cole also notes that "by
1965, the number of degrees awarded might have increased by 50% or more, for according
to the Education Commission, there were then 32,000 enrolled law students, which could
well result in an annual average of 9,000 gradates (as against 6,000/year for 1952-58)." Id. at
3. Cole also cites a study by T.G. Bastedo who found that only "between one third and one
half of law students definitely intend to pursue a career in law practice." Id. For the full
study see, T.G. Bastedo, I I L. & Soc'y REv. 269 (1968-1969).
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follow that the non-lawyer law graduates will go unemployed."1 54 But Cole
wanted Ford to understand that the limited type of law lawyers practiced,
the reputation the lawyers had among the public, the lack of good employ-
ment opportunities for law graduates, and that so many law graduates chose
not to practice indeed deadened student-motivation towards learning in the
classroom.1 55 Such factors, moreover, inhibited teacher-enthusiasm. "A
faculty is bound to feel somewhat irrelevant to the profession if the bulk of
the product of legal education does not find its way into the profession."1 56
The structure of the profession also impacted legal education in one
other important way, according to Cole. The reason why much of the pub-
lic (including students and faculty) felt disconnected to the legal profes-
sion was because of how lawyers obtained their fees-mainly on the basis
of how frequently they appeared in court.157 In order to maximize their
earnings, Cole found that lawyers purposely kept cases in court for long
periods of time.' 58 Even worse, Cole reported that he knew of lawyers
who engaged in outright illegal activity, from bribing judges to padding
fee-statements to lying about appearances they made in court.159 With
such behavior being quite common, law courses purporting to teach legal
ethics were hardly taken seriously by either students or professors.60
Cole found this lack of interest students had in learning-and professors
had in teaching-ethics and professional responsibility to be "definitely
depressing to professional education."161
Many of Cole's other criticisms were reiterations of points made by
Ford's past consultants. But the manner in which he articulated his posi-
tion was in a much dire tone. For instance, while like his predecessors he
despaired over how students learned-mainly through memorization of
black-letter rules-the process, according to Cole, had larger, negative
ramifications for all of society. As he asserted:
"The cost [in the way students are taught, and then in turn the way they practice],
I firmly believe, is a major net loss to the nation of the potential professional
product of tens of thousands of highly trained people in helping to solve the
problems of clients better . . . to maximize the satisfaction of private needs, to
154. In fact, from Cole's own work as well as work he cites from Galanter and Bastedo,
there is a sense that eventually "all of the law graduates find [non-practicing] jobs of some
sort." Cole, supra note 145 at 3.
155. Id. at 4-5.
156. Id. at4.
157. Id. at 5. For a full discussion of this aspect of the legal profession, see Jayanth K.
Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM. ASIAN REV.
93 (2003); Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, "Bread for the Poor"" Access to Justice
and the Rights of the Needy in India, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2004).
158. See Cole, supra 145 note 5-6. Lawyers did this primarily by abusing the numerous
interlocutory appeals that are allowed under the Indian system. This abuse has continued to
the present day, and for a discussion of this point see, Krishnan, supra note 157; Galanter &
Krishnan, supra note 157.
159. Cole, supra 145 note 5-6.
160. Id. at 6.
161. Id.
2004
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
contribute to the private solution of public problems, and to promote the stabiliz-
ing, democratizing functions and respect for the legal system."1
62
In keeping with his "grandiose"1 63 analysis, Cole urged Ford to view
this woeful type of pedagogical instruction as a function of the socio-
economic and political ills plaguing Indian society. For one thing, because
of poor salaries, low social status, and unpleasant physical working envi-
ronments, the legal teaching profession did not attract the top legal minds.
It was therefore unfair to expect those who entered the academy to per-
form at anything beyond a mediocre level in the classroom.1 64
In addition, legal educators had to work within the larger university
structure, which was very political and often iniquitous.1 65 Cole tried to
impress upon Ford the need to understand that overhauling legal educa-
tion would be a monumental task because the universities under which
law schools operated were: resistant to change;166 intensely bureaucratic;
corrupt; wedded to outdated standards for evaluating employees; and
highly inefficient.167 And universities themselves operated in the shadow
of the intrusive central government, which along with appointing adminis-
tration officials, setting admissions policies, and writing the schools' rules
of governance also allocated resources through an agency known as the
University Grants Commission (UGC).168 The priorities of the govern-
ment thus became the priorities of university officials. For reasons stated
above though, legal education was a "low priority." 169 The government
was not interested in revamping how it functioned and appeared content
with the current situation. 170 Law faculty who sought to institute even the
slightest changes faced resistance from both their own university and the
government. 17 1 Because of such institutional hostility to innovation and
reform, most legal educators eventually resigned themselves to the belief
that the status quo was permanent and that they made little difference in
the grand scheme of the educational process. 172
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 9-12; 23-4. (And note, lackluster professors within the law schools deterred the
brightest students from wanting to enroll in these institutions. Mediocre to poor students
only further disillusioned teachers and this cycle continued, thereby perpetuating the status
quo within Indian law schools.)
165. Id. at 12-17.
166. See id. at 14 (noting that "overall, this system is calculated to say no and not to say
yes. It stifles innovation and frustrates the individualism and self-determination that one
associates with the faculty man and that forms the conditions for his self regulation and aca-
denic freedom. The system is calculated to reduce his self respect.")
167. See id. at 12-17.
168. Id. at 21-23. The government of the state in which the university was located also
played a role in how university administration operated.
169. Id. at 22.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 14.
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Cole then proceeded to cite other familiar problems. Inadequate
library facilities and textbooks, disputes over what language should be
used in the classroom, lack of faculty scholarship, and weak administra-
tive leaders all contributed to hampering legal education. 173 Student-
discipline was also an issue; cheating and truancy were common and the
overall quality of the students he observed was sub-par. 174 And most
Indian law schools were simply not tying their educational goals to the
practice itself. According to Cole, this ultimately affected the quality of:
statutes passed by legislators, judgments rendered by courts; and legal ser-
vices provided to private clients as well as to public interest causes. 175
Based on his in-depth observations, Cole made a series of sweeping
recommendations that hugely impacted Ford's legal education program.
First, Cole called for revamping how governmental and Ford resources
were being spent. More money per student needed to be invested. 176
Legal educational institutions also had to stop admitting, educating, and
thus investing in low quality students, as this practice was draining
already scarce resources and placing into the market an oversupply of
unemployable graduates.' 77 Cole argued, too, that the manner in which
law campuses were funded had to be more transparent, and that govern-
ment officials and university administrators needed to be held accountable
for their decisions. 178
The legal profession required diversification as well. Cole pressed
Ford to encourage the government, the Bar Council of India, and legal
educational institutions to work cooperatively in developing new opportu-
nities for graduates to pursue a legal career. 179 He also believed that Ford
could help fund surveys that examined the desires and needs of practicing
lawyers, law students, law graduates, and faculty. And Ford could support
teaching-training programs for Indian law faculty by developing rigorous
LL.M. programs within the country that focused on pedagogy, and by
sending promising Indian teachers abroad to learn about teaching tech-
niques in other law school environments. 180
173. See id. 17-34.
174. See id. 17-21 (Cole also noted that many students also could simply not afford to pur-
chase textbooks. Obviously, he found no fault in the students for this, but he did note that this
was another factor affecting student participation and "enthusiasm" towards their education.)
175. Id. at 26-27.
176. Id. at 27-34
177. Id. at 30-33.
178. Id. at 34-35.
179. Id. at 35-37. (Cole specifically believed that lawyers could be useful in working in
government policy jobs or in the public interest sector. However, to that point these were
two areas that were dominated by civil servants and social workers, respectively. But if legal
education was structured in such a way where graduates would leave law school with some
sense of how to work in these types of environments, then was no reason why they could not
forge a career in such sectors.)
180. Id. at 42-49. (Cole did not believe, however, that one-year LL.M. programs at U.S.
law schools were useful for foreign teachers. These programs have been "inadequate and
insensitive," Cole noted, to the needs of foreign teachers. He thus suggested that if foreign
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Although Cole's suggestions included vast reforms, he did think that
Ford ought to continue playing a role in legal education.181 He was even
complimentary of the advancements that law faculties had made to date
(with Ford's assistance), citing that "incremental improvements" in the
culture of legal education was noticeable.182 But if legal education was
substantively to change in India, then real reforms and greater financial
commitments from Ford and the government of India needed to be made.
Like his predecessors though Cole believed that ultimately this change
had to come from within India. Only those who knew India's culture,
colonial and post-colonial history, and the intricate legal system could
make any meaningful difference. As he concluded: "The best thing is to
find Indian members of the legal community with imagination and a drive
to get things done, and give them some resources to get things done."163
After receiving Robert Cole's report, and then reviewing all the con-
clusions of its past consultants, Ford policy-makers at the end of 1971 in
both Delhi and New York re-prioritized their goals for India.'8 4 Although
Ford expended great time, energy, and resources to study and improve
legal education, the bulk of its work in India remained focused on a dif-
ferent area: agricultural reform. 185 Ford officials decided that they would
continue to work on the Indian agricultural sector; however, because the
task of reforming legal education now seemed more monumental than
ever, the Foundation ceased concentrating on this subject.186 The senti-
ment among policy-makers was that the problems identified by the
American consultants would take many years to address and require a
substantially greater financial contribution from Ford; and even then there
was little guarantee that these efforts would succeed.
So what happened after 1971? As the Ford consultants believed, there
were Indians who had their own innovative ideas on reforming legal edu-
cation. Many of these individuals indeed sought to make sweeping changes
to how law faculties operated. But ironically, my research also reveals that
teachers were to come to the U.S., that they be exposed to programs that specifically focus
on what foreign teachers can learn and then take back with them to their home countries to
make them effective educators.)
181. Id. at 59-62.
182. Id. at 59 (noting, for example, that there was an increase in the production of better
casebooks; that law teachers were beginning to move away from the pure lecture method of
teaching; that moot court teams, legal writing exercises, and problem-based approaches to
the law were becoming more frequent in classroom; and that faculty was beginning to see
the importance of research and publications. See also Id. at 11 12.)
183. Id. at 62. Although Cole, quite directly, stated that finding these "Indian members of
the legal community" would be difficult as there is a "dearth of such people" in the country
at present. (Id.)
184. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004; Author interview
with Carolyn Elliott, (former Ford official), April 1, 2004.
185. Id. Also see Ford Website: www.ford.org.
186. Author interview with Arthur von Mehren, February 19, 2004; Author interview
with Carolyn Elliott, (former Ford official). April 1, 2004
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in fact many of the changes that were proposed and eventually occurred
drew upon the suggestions offered by the American professors.
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIAN LEGAL EDUCATION:
THE POST-FORD YEARS
Several Indian governmental commissions were interested in
revamping legal education even before the Ford Foundation entered the
scene. During the British era, various Indian committees examined this
issue.1 87 Then after Independence, the 1958 Law Commission report and
the 1964 Gajendragadkar report both focused on reforming Indian law
schools.188 (Recall that some of the U.S. consultants even referenced
these two latter studies in their memos to Ford.189) But the 1960s and
1970s saw a young generation of Indian academics begin to offer their
own new and exciting proposals.
One of these innovators was a little-known law professor named
N.R. Madhava Menon. Although a south Indian by origin,190 Menon
began his academic career in 1960 in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh at
Aligarh University.19 1 In 1965, Menon moved to the Delhi University
Law Faculty, where he came into frequent contact with several of the
American law professors working for Ford.192 According to Menon, this
exposure highlighted to him the importance of Indian and American legal
educators working together and learning from one another. 193
Like Arthur von Mehren, Carl Spaeth, Robert Cole and others,
Menon early on believed that Indian legal education was far from ade-
quate. But during the 1960s, the Bar Council of India (BCI) had statutory
authority to regulate education.194 Contrary to the views of the American
consultants as well as Menon, the BCI at that time saw law schools as
purely vocational institutions. 195 To be sure, the BCI leadership had its
187. See supra notes 46-59.
188. See id.
189. Among these professors included Carl Spaeth, H.C.L. Merrillat, and Arthur von Mehren.
190. Menon was born and raised in the southern state of Kerala.
191. From February 29, 2004 to March 2nd, 2004, the author spent three full days at the
National Judicial Academy (NJA), in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, where Menon currently
serves as the institution's director. During this time, the author interviewed Menon on sever-
al different occasions and intensely observed Menon's administrative skills. (The NJA is a
new institution that formed one year ago, with the purpose of providing training and educa-
tion to judges in India.) The information on which the author basis his discussion of Menon
comes from these interview sessions as well as from a brief forty page autobiography enti-
tled, EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: SOME INSIGHTS FROM THE NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL
EXPERIENCE, by Dr. N.R. Madhava Menon, August 1998 (on file with author) thereinafter
EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION.]
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own agenda; these leaders were not from the elite sections of Indian soci-
ety nor were most of them upper castes. 196 They believed that for too long
ordinary Indians lacked access to the legal process, and to remedy this
problem, the BCI approved the opening of hundreds of new assembly-line
law colleges during the 1960s and 1970s.197 The rationale was that the
more opportunities everyday Indians had to legal education, the more
likely the law and those who practiced within the profession would reflect
the values of the vast majority of the population.198
Menon sympathized with the BCI's mission. As someone committed
to the egalitarian principles set forth in the Indian constitution, Menon too
believed that law and legal education needed to serve all of society. 199
However, the many BCI-sanctioned institutions cropping up simply did
not provide students with a solid education. The problems noted by Ford's
American consultants were ones that troubled Menon as well. 200 Worried
that Indian legal education was spiraling downwards, Menon took a sab-
batical from Delhi University during the 1969-1970 academic-year to
travel to Columbia University's Law School. 20 1 Menon had learned, part-
ly through his interaction with Professor Harry Jones (mentioned above)
who had visited Delhi University, that Columbia prided itself on merging
both the theory and practice of law. 202 Menon eagerly sought to learn how
Columbia had accomplished this mission.
This sabbatical that Menon took would turn out to be the most
important one-year of his professional life.203 "I realized so many possi-
bilities for our law schools here [in India] after going to Columbia." 204
For example, Menon spent a great deal of time observing how Columbia's
clinical legal aid program operated. He was inspired by how law students,
under the supervision of dedicated professors, could serve the needs of
clients who otherwise would not receive legal representation. 205 Menon





200. Id. For example, Menon decried the lecture-based, rule-oriented manner in which
students were taught. There was no theory offered in the classrooms. Students were simply
educated on the rules of law; teachers did not publish; the quality of the atmosphere in these
institutions was sub-optimal; and according to Menon ultimately three-quarters of these law
schools were miserable, degree-stamping institutional failures, while the remaining one-
quarter barely could qualify as mediocre.
201. Id.; also see EXCELLENCE [N HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 38. Note, the lat-
ter citation states that Menon was a fellow at Columbia from 1970-71, but in his interview
with the author Menon noted that the years of his sabbatical occurred during 1969-70.
202. Id- Recall Professor Harry Jones was a distinguished professor at Columbia Law
School for several years.
203. Id.
204. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
205. Id.
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law expert who advocated that law professors include a practical dimen-
sion to even the most doctrinally-based courses. 206 And Menon received
his first exposure to how law could be taught in conjunction with other
academic disciplines. He was enthralled by the work several Columbia
professors were doing on the intersection between law and social
science. 207 In furtherance of this interest, in the summer of 1970 Menon
enrolled in a six-week workshop taught by Professors Marc Galanter
and Richard Schwartz at Northwestern University Law School that
specifically examined law and social science and the application of empir-
ical methods of research in India. 208
Menon was inspired and energized by what he learned in the United
States. He especially wanted to establish a small legal aid clinic at Delhi
University. But confirming Robert Cole's description of university poli-
tics in India, Menon knew that his supervising administration would place
bureaucratic obstacles in his way and be reluctant to fund this project.
Thus before leaving Columbia, Menon befriended several Indians who
too were interested in issues of social justice back in their home country.
Through tireless efforts, Menon worked to raise two thousand dollars-a
large amount by Indian standards-from his contacts at Columbia that he
then took with him back to Delhi creating the university's first-ever legal
aid clinic. 209
Menon's next step was to generate student enthusiasm for his clinic.
In its first year, the clinic had twelve students who, under Menon's super-
vision, worked primarily on providing legal assistance to prisoners.2 10
One of these cases actually made national news, as Menon and his stu-
dents helped to exonerate a wrongfully convicted defendant who was
spending time in a New Delhi prison.211 This episode, together with his
fundraising abilities in the U.S., his zeal for emphasizing both the theoret-
ical and practical aspects of the law, and his increasingly frequent editori-
al contributions in newspapers on the subject of reforming legal education
brought Menon a great deal of attention within judicial circles.
In particular, Supreme Court Justice Krishna Iyer in 1973 invited
Menon to help write a national report on the status of access to justice in
206. Id. Metron noted that he was inspired by Gellhom also because the Columbia profes-
sor taught students that there was a social or public interest dimension to how law was prac-
ticed. Public policy was an important element to Gellhom's teaching and Menon noted that
after seeing Gellhorn perform in the classroom, he planned to encourage his fellow col-
leagues in India to consider teaching in this manner as well.
207. Id. During this time the law and society movement in the U.S. was just begin to
develop into a formal organization. Menon stated that he found himself very attracted to this
movement to thinking about law in an interdisciplinary fashion.
208. Id. Also, author interview with Professor Marc Galanter, April 1, 2004. Note this
workshop was sponsored by the International Legal Center, which was a Ford-funded
institute.
209. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004. Menon ran this clinic with a fellow




THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
India. 212 Menon took this opportunity to promote legal aid clinics on law
campuses. 2 13 He also argued that law faculties had to reach out to-and
work with-public interest non-governmental organizations that were
focusing on helping the poor realize their rights. 214 And the educational
curriculum for law students required a shift from a purely doctrinal con-
centration to one that examined how law intersected with larger public
policy issues. 2t 5 Menon's underlying point was that legal educational
institutions now had an opening; the time was ripe to bring into the fold
millions of Indians who felt marginalized by the legal process.
Although he continued trying to enact various reforms while at Delhi
University, the institutional structure within which Menon worked limited
his ability to make substantive change. Therefore in 1974, when Menon
received an invitation from a state in south-eastern India, Pondicherry, to
start up a new law program affiliated with that state's main college, he
decided to pursue this exciting opportunity. As he noted, he "had never
been to Pondicherry before," 216 nor did he have "experience of heading
an academic institution, much less building up one ... [, but he] decided
to take it as a challenge" 217 and test whether his ideas could work. 218
Menon proceeded to spend four years in Pondicherry. 2 19 During his
tenure he encountered great difficulties. While the bureaucratic red-tape at
Delhi University was thought to be problematic, it did not compare to the
nightmarish conditions present at Pondicherry College. Administrators,
teachers, and students who expected the new law center to function like
other long-standing Indian legal educational institutions refused even to
discuss many of Menon's "radical" 220 proposals, such as recognizing and
rewarding faculty scholarship, improving existing library facilities, intro-
ducing new methods of testing, and increasing admissions standards. 22 1
As he noted, that the College could "kill [such] innovation and experi-
mentation was far beyond my imagination and comprehension." 222
Nevertheless, Menon came away from Pondicherry a much wiser
212. See REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID--PROCESSUAL JUSTICE TO THE
PEOPLE (India Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs, Department of Legal Affairs,
1973) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEE]. Krishna Iyer saw this report as a




216. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 8. Actually, Pondicherry is
not exactly a state, but what the Indian government refers to as a "union territory." There are
currently six union territories in India.
217. Id.
218. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
219. Id.; also see EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 8.
220. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004; this was how many people at the
College viewed Menon's ideas.
221. id.
222. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 8.
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administrator and manager. 223 To many people's surprise he was even
able to make three major reforms. First, he persuaded grudging faculty
members to avoid using the standard lecture format and instead adopt a
more case-method, problem-based approach to educating students. 224
Second, Menon instituted a clinical education program, which enabled
students and professors to work with clients in the community. Third, the
curriculum he proposed, which was ultimately adopted, drew on the
lessons he learned while at Columbia Law School.225 Standard doctrinal
classes were taught not in a rule-oriented manner, but with an eye towards
larger issues concerning legal theory, public policy, and social justice.
And students now had the opportunity to enroll in more practical, skills-
based courses, such as statutory drafting. 226
Four years, however, proved long enough for Menon. He was tired
and opted not to renew his contract at Pondicherry. In 1978 Menon
returned to Delhi University, but his accomplishments during his time
away had become well-known. For many observers, perhaps most impres-
sive about Menon's tenure at Pondicherry was that he continued to pursue
his goals despite what was occurring politically in the country. From 1975
to 1977 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended the country's democratic
constitution. During this Emergency Period, Mrs. Gandhi ruled by decree,
arguing that the state faced a national security threat from opposition
forces in the country.2 27 The Prime Minister imprisoned thousands of
political opponents and rights activists and used the legal system and the
rule of law for her own instrumental purposes.2 28
Given Menon's belief that law faculties ought to help empower the
traditionally under-represented and politically marginalized, one might
think that he and the Pondicherry Law College would have been targeted
by the Indira Gandhi government. But Menon explained that neither he
nor his law faculty suffered retribution during the Emergency Period. 229
223 Id. (noting "four years at Pondicherry enabled me to understand the dynamics of
institutional structures and the mechanics of institution building in situations not necessarily
receptive to change. I got intimate lessons of management which in the final analysis, dictat-
ed the pace and directions of change in every setting.")
224. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. Grassroots activists remained skeptical; they cited several self-interested factors
that caused her to suspend the constitution. The economy was weak. The public disapproved
of her policies, leading to opposition leaders calling on the military to oust her from power.
And she was convicted of corruption charges in a state court in Gujarat. See infra note 228.
228. For a selected set of insightful readings discussing the Emergency Period, see JAMES
MANOR, NEHRU TO THE NINETIES: THE CHANGING OFFICE OF PRIME MINISTER IN INDIA (1994),
STANLEY WOLPERT, THE NEW HISTORY OF INDIA (1998); ATUL KOHL], THE STATE AND
POVERTY IN INDIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1987); ATUL KOHLI, DEMOCRACY AND
DIsCONTENT: INDIA'S GROWING CRISIS OF GOVERNAIILITY; GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A
DEMOCRATIC CONSTrrIUTION (2000).
229- Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
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One reason he speculated that Mrs. Gandhi "left [him] alone" 230 was that
perhaps she saw her Emergency Rule agenda, a main part of which
included a "war on poverty," as being related to Menon's goal of provid-
ing the poor with more education of their rights as citizens.231 In her
rhetoric, Menon recalled, Mrs. Gandhi would often state that she had to
suspend the constitution in order to protect the interests of the poor. 232
Because his small law project posed no perceived threat to the govern-
ment, Menon claimed "she did not bother with us." 233
As stated, Menon returned to Delhi in 1978. But almost immediately
upon his arrival, the Bar Council of India (BCI)-which still maintained a
hold on the creation of legal educational centers-asked him to help "in
restructuring legal education throughout the country with a view to influence
professional development for better delivery of justice."234 Although Menon
had just completed a grueling four years in Pondicherry, he saw BCI's invi-
tation as a "rare chance to shape [the future of] education policy in India." 235
He thus agreed and by 1980 he was named as the Secretary of the organiza-
tion.236 It was during his time at the BCI that Menon began developing a
new full-fledged educational curriculum for Indian law students.
For instance, one of the main issues Menon focused on involved
examining the length of time a law student needed to study before graduat-
ing. Recall that several of the Ford consultants and the Gajendragadkar
Committee recommended students spend three years earning their LL.B.
while the Law Commission of 1958 argued for only two years. Although
they differed on this issue of duration, these authorities all agreed that a
baccalaureate degree should be a prerequisite of admission. 237 Their rea-
soning was that legal education was complex and that a student coming out
of high school at age eighteen was not sophisticated enough to tackle the
tough legal questions addressed by law faculties. Menon, however, argued
that mandating a bachelor's degree was unnecessary. In part this view
stemmed from a belief that the undergraduate experience in India-as
Robert Cole stated in his report 238-did little to prepare future law students.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. id. Of course for the reasons stated in supra note 227, this claim was both chastised
and viewed with great cynicism by Mrs. Gandhi's opponents,
233. Id.
234. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 9.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 38.
237. See supra notes 46-59.
238. In his report, Cole deened the manner in which university students were educated
and the manner in which they approached the issue of education itself. See Cole, supra note
at 17-20. We have already discussed the pitfalls involved in educating students in India, but
Cole also noted that his experience at Delhi University gave him the impression that many
students simply did not care or want to be in college. They had poor study habits, cared little
about attending classes, and frequently engaged in what he called petty cheating. Menon too,
it seems, believed that given this situation, having a B.A. or B.S. before entering law school
did not do much in terms of preparing students for what was to come.
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Menon thus suggested that Indian legal education move from a three-year,
post-baccalaureate program to a comprehensive, B.A./LL.B five-year sys-
tem, where students would enter directly upon graduation from high school
and matriculate from his proposed program with both degrees. 239
Menon's idea was that this five-year law program would be as rigor-
ous as any engineering or medical school curriculum, both of which had
the reputation in India for being highly demanding.240 Moreover, he
believed that a five-year program would best be able to incorporate the
strengths found in American law schools together with the strengths he
had seen in European Continental law schools-the latter being a model
he had studied for the past several years. 241 For example, in the first two
years of this five-year program, students would take a combination of
doctrinal law courses and social science and humanities subjects. 242 They
would be required to write papers throughout the term, as well as com-
plete difficult comprehensive exams testing their analytical abilities.243
During the third and fourth years, the courses would be primarily law sub-
jects, but students would also be asked to enroll in skills-based classes or
their choice of different public interest clinics. In the fifth year, students
could take electives, but regardless of their selection, there would remain
a strong clinic and writing component to these final year courses. And in
terms of evaluation, students would be tested regularly, rather than the old
system where exams were given only at the end of the academic year.2 "
Menon completed his proposal for revamping Indian legal education
in 1982. He then began to showcase this idea to various constituents,
including lawyers, law professors, students, and politicians. 245 Despite his
best efforts, Menon met resistance from people in each of these groups.
Even his former colleague and dean at Delhi University, P.K. Tripathi,
wrote an editorial in the national newspaper, Times of India, deriding
239. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004; EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION,
supra note 191 at 10.
240. He despised the fact that "law ... [had become] reserved for the rejects from other
disciplines and for those who wanted it cheap and with least effort." EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 15.
241. Among the most important aspect to the European model that Menon appreciated,
was the fact that one could indeed enter law school upon graduation from high school.
242. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004. See also N.R. Madhava Menon,
Reforming Legal Education: Issues, Priorities, and Proposals, in ALL INDIA TEACHERS'
ASSOCIATION; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 1980S,
22 (1979) [hereinafter REFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION]; N.R. Madhava Menon, Changes in
the Law Curriculum-A Proposal, in ALL INDIA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION: REPORT ON THE
COMMrrrEEON REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE 1980s, 51 (1979) [hereinafter CHANGES
IN THE LAW CURRICULUM].
243. Id.
244. In fact, Menon proposed moving away from a full-year term system to a trimester
system.
245. See EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 9; Author interview with
Menon, Feb. 29,2004.
2004
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
Menon's plans as unrealistic, simplistic, and unnecessarily radical. 246 On
more than one occasion critics petitioned the Bar Council of India to sack
the "relentlessly uncompromising" Menon.247 Frustrated that he was unable
to persuade even one institution in the country to experiment with his pro-
posal, Menon left the Bar Council in 1983 and took proverbial refuge in the
United States for one year where he reunited with inspirational allies at
Columbia University who sympathized with his reform efforts. 248
TRACING THE ROOTS OF AN INDEPENDENT LAW SCHOOL
The many problems Robert Cole identified with university life in
India proved to be obstacles that impeded Menon from enacting his pro-
posals. Earlier we discussed how the Law Commission Report of 1958
criticized those institutions that, at the time, admitted graduating high
school students. By the time Menon sought to implement his combined
five-year, B.A./L.L.B. plan, however, legal educational institutions had
stopped this practice and mainly operated in one of two ways. There was
what we might call the "northern system," whereby institutions such as
Delhi University, Banaras Hindu University, and Lucknow University had
"law faculties" that awarded the LL.B. degree upon the completion of a
three-year law program. 249 These law faculties could also award post-
graduate degrees in law, including an LL.M and/or Ph.D. Then there was
the peninsular or southern system, whereby a university would serve as an
umbrella, degree-granting institution with various "law colleges" attached
to it.250 This particular system functioned much like the British university
model, where in many cases these law colleges would be essentially inde-
pendent, with little supervision from the university administration.25 '
Menon initially hoped that his ideas would be accepted by some law
programs in the north and the south. Because he had long been affiliated
with Delhi University, he expected his colleagues in the north at least to
give his proposal a chance. In the south, because many law colleges were
much more autonomous, Menon thought he might find some faculties will-
ing to experiment. 252 But he had no such luck. The university structure,
even in the south, and the politics involved in trying to implement change
246. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
247. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 9.
248. Id. at 10
249 Id.
250. So, for example, Bombay University had several different law colleges affiliated to
it, some located a great distance from the university's administrative headquarters.
251. The reason for this split between how northern universities and southern universities
operated dates back to the British period. Within the southern system, universities, in addi-
tion to law colleges, also had "law departments" which awarded LL.M. and/or Ph D. degrees
to students interested in pursuing post-LL.B, law work. See also, supra note 23. Note,
whether it be with law faculties in the north or law colleges in the south, by the time Menon
sought to make changes, a student needed a baccalaureate degree before pursuing an LL.B.
252. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
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in both regions were just too great to overcome. Thus "the idea of setting
up an alternative independent law school"253 started to become a more
attractive proposition. An independent law school would not be burdened
with the constraints and bureaucracy that were inherent in the university
structure, and it would allow for more potentially innovative pedagogical
experimentation. 254
But this idea for an independent legal institution did not originate
from Menon; rather it had historical antecedents upon which Menon read-
ily admitted he drew. Legal education in India, recall, was historically
provincial; students tended to enroll in a law program located near to
where they lived. But as early as 1964, even the Gajendragadkar
Committee discussed the possibility of creating what it called a "National
Law School," where the best students from all over the country would
come together to study. As the Committee reported:
"[S]ome of us felt that it would perhaps be a good idea if three or four model
National Law Schools are instituted in our country. . . . These National Law
Schools ... would be able to attract eminent law teachers who believe in the sig-
nificance and importance of reorienting legal education in India and who would
be prepared to dedicate themselves to that task .... [Also] these National Law
Schools would enjoy more freedom of action in trying newer and newer experi-
ments in improving legal education." 255
Although the Committee envisioned these National Law Schools as
being part of a "University community,"2 56 it believed that in order "to
revolutionize legal education," 257 there could not be the "external hin-
drance or impediment[s]" 258 typically associated with the traditional
bureaucratic university structure. Creating "separate [law] institutions" 259
then might be the best way to re-energize legal education. 260 While no
immediate developments were made on this front, about a decade later the
idea of a National Law School once again reemerged. This time it was
raised in an influential government-sponsored report written by a young
law professor at Delhi University, Upendra Baxi.26 1 Baxi, who would
later go on to be India's most prominent legal academic, discussed
the National Law School idea only in passing, but his report contained
253. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 10; see also Changes in the
Law Curriculum, supra note 242.
254. See EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 10-11.
255. See Gajendragadkar Report, supra notes 92 at 33.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 34.
258. Id. at 34,
259. Id.
260. Although the Committee did point out that if the traditional law schools in fact
embraced and implemented all of the reforms it suggested (see supra notes 94-103), then
perhaps these new national law schools would not be needed. See id.
261. The government agency that sponsored the report was the University Grants
Commission, in 1975. For a discussion of the UGC, see supra note 115. Baxi republished his
contribution to the UGC in an article entitled: Notes Towards a Socially Relevant Legal
Education, 5 JOURNAL OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA 23 (1976).
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observations that influenced Menon in subsequent years when he promot-
ed the independent law school model.
For example, Baxi argued that the current law curriculum largely
ignored questions of "social relevance." 262 Law students, of course, need-
ed to learn the black-letter law, or what he called "hard Iaw." 263 And
indeed it was important, as many of the Ford consultants earlier had
noted, that students take courses that focus on larger theoretical principles
and that test their analytical abilities. But Baxi also believed that law cur-
ricula had to address those particular issues affecting the "Indian
milieu," 264 such as agricultural reform, "under-privilege, exploitation [of
the traditionally oppressed] and destitution." 265
In addition, Baxi wondered whether adopting the American case
method approach to teaching-as was being attempted at Delhi and
Banaras Universities-was appropriate for Indian law programs. 266 He
observed a number of constraints on Indian law professors that prevented
them from successfully incorporating this method into their teaching. For
one thing, law teachers traditionally saw themselves as "gurus," whereby
they would impart knowledge to their students through lectures. The case
method approach, however, allowed students to be engaged in class and to
ask questions of the professor, answers to which the guru sometimes did
not know. 267 In an environment where law teachers were already thought
of as second-rate and felt enormous insecurity, it was unsurprising that
they did not allow the case-method approach to run freely in the class-
room. The result in many classes, Baxi noted, was a stilted, unnatural dia-
logue where neither the student nor the teacher left the class intellectually
satisfied. 268
The case method approach was also struggling because the case-
books being used were inadequate. 269 Furthermore, Indian legal educa-
tional institutions continued to lack library facilities with the necessary
resources for students and professors to investigate in greater detail the
262. See id at 31. Note at that time, most Indian law schools mandated that students take
the following core courses: Indian Legal and Constitutional History; Contracts; Torts;
Family Law; Criminal law and Procedure; Constitutional Law of India; Property Law;
Evidence; Legal Theory; and Civil Procedure. There were then eighteen elective courses that
most law schools offered, including: Administrative Law; Equity; Public International Law;
Company Law; Labor Law; Taxation; International Organizations; Bankruptcy; Law of
Cooperation and Public Control of Business; Military Law; insurance Law; Trust and Other
Fiduciary Obligations; Trademarks and Patents, International Economic Law; Criminology
and Criminal Administration; Interpretation of Statutes and Principles of Legislation; Legal
Remedies; and Private International Law.
263. Id. at 32.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 31-32.
266. Id. at 38.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 39.
269. Id.
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problems and case-based issues discussed in class. And many teachers
simply refused to relinquish the lecture oriented method as their main
pedagogical tool in the classroom. 270 For these reasons Baxi argued that:
"What is sauce for the goose is not the sauce for the gander American or
any other transplant simply will not do. We have to find some homespun
ways of pedagogic change." 27'
Baxi's observations-that law programs in India failed to train stu-
dents on the "social relevance" of law and that the case-method approach
had serious flaws-brought to Menon's attention issues he knew any new
independent law school needed to address. But over the next few years,
Menon became convinced that starting a "fresh"272 institution not wedded
to the traditions of a university would be best able to deal with Baxi's crit-
icisms. The return to democracy in 1977, which brought great ferment in
the Indian legal world and inspired hope that institutions-including law
schools--could be fashioned to protect the rights of the powerless,273 also
greatly shaped Menon. In particular, a small number of judges and
lawyers during the 1980s, seeking ways to actualize the Constitution's
promises of justice, embarked on a series of unprecedented and electrify-
ing initiatives. These included relaxation of requirements of standing in
court, emergence of commissions investigating human rights violations,
appointment of lawyers as representatives of client groups, and a so-called
"epistolary jurisdiction" in which judges took the initiative to respond
proactively to grievances brought to their attention by third parties, letters,
or newspaper accounts. 274 Public interest litigation, or social action litiga-
tion, as these initiatives soon became called, sought to use judicial power
to protect excluded and powerless groups (such as prisoners, migrant
laborers, and the environmentally susceptible) and to secure entitlements
that were going unredeemed. 275 Menon felt that were there flexible, inno-
270. Id. at 39-40.
271. Id. at 40. Baxi then went on to discuss how specifically the Bar Council of India and
the UGC could work together to improve textbooks in the country. The last section of the
article then dealt with out to improve the LLM programs in Indian law schools.
272. Id. at 42.
273. See generally Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously, in JUDGES AND THE
JUDICIAL POWER (Rajeev Dhavan, R. Sudarshan, and Salman Khurshid, eds., 1985), Smithu
Kothari, Social Movements and the Redefinition of Democracy, in INDIA BRIEFING, 1993
141-51 (Philip Oldenburg, ed., 1993) (noting that following the Emergency there was an
enthusiasm among civil rights and public interest organizations that democracy could be
ensured by the rule of law).
274. See generally Galanter and Krishnan, supra note 157. Also see, P.N. Bhagwati,
Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. LAW 561
(1985); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36 JOURNAL OF THE
INDIAN LAW INSTITUJTE 302 (1994) [hereinafter Dhavan, Law as Struggle]; Carl Baar, Social
Action Litigation in India: The Operations and Limitations on the Worlds Most Active
Judiciary, 19 POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL 140, 142, 147 (1990).
275. For a recent and comprehensive account, see S.P. Sathe, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORMING LIMITS (2002). The vast literature includes
Baar, supra note 273; UPENDRA BAXi. COURAGE, CRAFT, AND CONTENTION: THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE 1980's (1985); Bhagwati, 273 note 25; Dhavan, Law as Struggle, supra note
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vative, and unencumbered law schools with socially conscious legal aid
clinics, such institutions could make an important contribution to this
growing public interest movement.
Therefore, there was historical precedent discussing the creation of
an independent law school well before Menon began proposing this idea.
To his credit, Menon recognized and carefully studied these antecedents
as he put together his independent law school model. Concurrent political
developments appear to have influenced his planning as well. As we shall
see below, soon Menon's dream of establishing an alternative legal educa-
tional institution would come to fruition. Very few people, however,
could have predicted how well such a new model eventually would fare.
CREATING A "NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL" IN BANGALORE
Menon left his position at the Bar Council in 1983 and spent the rest
of the year (and part of 1984) in the United States. During his stay he
traveled to various American law schools marveling at how clinical legal
education had grown over the past decade. The U.S. had experienced its
own burgeoning public interest movement during the 1970s, and with the
financial support of the Ford Foundation, several American law schools
began to institute legal aid clinics that attempted to promote public inter-
est causes. 276 Menon was especially excited at how students were educat-
ed in these clinics. Not only were they working closely under the mentor-
ship of passionate teachers, but they also received the opportunity to work
directly on behalf of clients-conducting legal research, drafting memos,
writing briefs, and sometimes even appearing in court. 277
273; Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the
Impossible? 37 AM. J. COMp. L. 495 (1989); Clark D. Cunningham, Public Interest
Litigation in the Indian Supreme Court: A Study in the Light of American Experience, 29
JOURNAL OF INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 494 (1987); Marc Galanter, New Patterns of Legal
Services in India, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN INDIA 279-295 (Rajeev Dhavan and Marc
Galanter eds., 1989) [hereinafter, Galanter New Patterns]; Baxi, supra note 273; Oliver
Mendelsohn, Life and Struggle in the Stone Quarries of lndia: A Case-Study, 29 JOURNAL OF
COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 43 (1991) [hereinafter, Mendelsohn, Life and
Struggle]; G.L. Peiris, Public Interest Litigation in the Indian Subcontinent: Current
Dimensions, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 66 (1991) S.P. Sathe, JudicialActivism, 10 JOURNAL OF
INDIAN SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 399 (1998); S.P. Sathe, Political Activism (I1): Post-
Emergency Judicial Activism: Liberty and Good Governance, 10 JOURNAL OF INDIAN
SCHOOL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 603 (1998); Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the Courts
of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIs. INT'L L.J. 58
(1994) Madhava Menon, Justice Sans Lawyers: Some Indian Experiments, 12 INDIAN BAR
REviEW 444 (1985).
276. Ford's initiative during this time was known as its council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR). Several of the country's top private and public law
schools received funding from Ford to establish legal aid clinics. For an extensive discussion
of how the CLEPR functioned, see the Ford website (www.fordfound.org).
277. Of course when students would appear in court, it would be under the auspices of a
licensed practitioner. Moreover, in my conversations with Menon, he noted that he did not
really follow an ongoing debate occurring within many U.S. law schools over whether clini-
cal teachers ought to be tenure-track faculty members. He was mainly interested in how the
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When Menon returned to India in 1984, he was reinvigorated. He
supported the public interest developments that were occurring at home
and wanted to build a law school that could help sustain this movement.
But because of the hurdles existing within the Indian university system,
Menon became convinced that the only way to accomplish his goal would
be by creating an independent law school.278 Yet few believed that such
an ambition was realistic. The Ford Foundation, because of its experience
in the 1950s and 1960s as well as on the advice of a prominent American
academic serving as its India-consultant at that time, opted to stay clear of
any legal education initiatives. 279 Most Indian academics and politicians
also did not think Menon had the ability to make such an institution suc-
ceed. 280 While Menon was viewed as an amicable individual, because he
did not have a strong record of scholarship nor a reputation for being an
intellectual star (like Baxi), there was great skepticism that he was the
right person for this job.281 Moreover, where would Menon find the
money to launch and sustain such a project?
Menon though remained undeterred; for one year he lobbied various
constituencies (including many of his critics) for moral, political, and
financial support. In 1985, the Bar Council of India decided to back
Menon's plan to set up an independent law school. 28 2 The Council
promised to donate close to one hundred seventy thousand dollars, and it
negotiated with the southern state of Kamataka to match this donation in
return for the new law school making its home in Kamataka's capital
of Bangalore. 28 3 As the money and groundbreaking started to become a
students were being taught and did not become involved in what he considered to be mainly
an issue for the American law schools to handle.
278. See EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 10-11.
279. Author interview with Dr. Carolyn Elliott, Former Program Officer, Ford
Foundation official working in India during this time, April 1, 2004. The American academ-
ic was Professor Marc Galanter. Galanter provided the author with a memo he wrote to Ford
indicating his great skepticism that Mcnon's idea could succeed. (Memo on file with author.)
Note, Elliott stressed that even if Galanter had not been wary, Ford still would likely not
have supported Menon. Ford, by this time, had moved to supporting more civil society
efforts, rather than governmental institutional legal projects, as it had done during the period
before the Emergency. There was a "sea-change" at Ford, according to Elliott, where the
feeling was among Ford policy-makers that the best way to enact socio-economic and politi-
cal change lay at the grassroots level.
280. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
281. Id.
282. See EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 11. One question that is
often asked is why the Council supported Menun. For one thing, the Council too had become
disillusioned with the quality of law graduates over the past several years. In addition, the
Council had a relationship with Menon; recall Menon had worked with the Council from
1978-83. The Council respected and trusted Menon's judgment and believed, like he did,
that legal education in India need to be revamped. And, the Council also supported the new
public interest litigation initiatives that were growing in India. It viewed having a law school
that could train students on the techniques and values of public interest litigation as crucial
to this movement's success.
283. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004. Note, although the Bar Council origi-
nally promised this amount, Menon noted that ultimately it only gave about $70,000.
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reality, a new problem arose. In 1986 some politicians and prominent
judges in Kamataka questioned whether Menon should necessarily serve
as the new law school's director. Several people started to advocate for
Upendra Baxi; after all, the argument went, if this was to be India's pre-
eminent law school, why not have the country's top legal scholar serve as
its leader?284
But Baxi was conflicted about being considered. Two years earlier,
the American company, Union Carbide, had a terrible gas leak at its plant
in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. 285 Thousands of people were killed and
injured, 286 and Baxi was serving as one of the leading advocates working
on behalf of the victims. 287 Baxi had grown increasingly disgusted with
the Indian government's desire to settle this matter in what he thought
was a hasty fashion. The Supreme Court's Chief Justice also publicly
seemed to support the government's efforts. 2 88 The Chief Justice's
284. id.: Author interview with Upendra Baxi, March 20, 2004. (Note, Baxi was too
modest to characterize his candidacy in the way that I but it is accepted that this was the
rationale of those who supported him.)
285. Much has been written about the Bhopal tragedy- For a selected set of readings, see
KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS
(2001); DOMINiQUE LAPIERRE AND JAVIER MORO, FIVE PAST MIDNIGH'I IN BHOPAL (2001); JAMIE
CASSELS, UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: UNCERTAIN PROMISES OF LAW (1994). Also for an on-
line set of resources, http://www.questia.con/popularSearcheslbhopal-disaster.jsp.
286. Obtaining a precise figure on how many people were killed has been difficult. Some
estimate that between 2,000 and 8,000 people were killed in the days immediately after the
leak, with 14,000 dying later as a result of related illnesses. I was just in Bhopal during
March 2004 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the leak, and estimates were that a
total of 20,000 people have died since 1984. See id.
287. Author interview with Baxi, March 20, 2004.
288. In fact, the Chief Justice remarked shortly after the accident that given India's over-
crowded, overburdened courts, the victims would be lucky to receive any compensation at
all. The politics of the Bhopal disaster are quite complicated. The accident took place on
December 4, 1984. Indeed because of the terribly high number of cases backlogging the
Indian court system (and the possibility of getting greater monetary damages in the U.S.,)
the Indian government pushed to have the case against Union Carbide tried in the U.S. (The
government of India in 1985 passed the Bhopal Act, which allowed it to represent the vic-
tims of the Bhopal disaster in the American courts.) The Indian government then came to the
U.S. and hired what is today the law firm of Robbins, Kaplan, Miller, and Ciresi in
Minneapolis to represent its interests. (Robbins had made its name in plaintiff's litigation
with its lawsuit over the Dalcon Shield birth control devices.) The case was heard in the
Southern District of New York Federal Court. Union Carbide in 1985 moved to have the
case dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. In 1986, the New York federal court
granted this motion and transferred the case back to India. The case was then assigned to a
district court in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh where in 1988 an Indian judge granted interim
financial relief to the victims. This decision was appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High
Court, where although overruling the lower court's decision, curiously cited a British statute
in granting its own interim relief to the victims. The case then was appealed to the Indian
Supreme Court, which took the unusual step in February 1989 of structuring a settlement
between the government of India and Union Carbide whereby the latter was to pay out $470
million dollars in damages to the victims-a wholly inadequate sum according to representa-
tives of the victims. We are approaching the twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal disaster,
and sadly, most of the victims still have not received compensation for their injuries, due to
governmental inefficiency and corruption. See supra note 285.
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position was especially troubling for Baxi, because if he took the job as
director, he would be working under the auspices of the Chief Justice, as
the new law school was to be structured in a way whereby the Chief
Justice would serve as the institution's ultimate head. 289 In addition, Baxi
worried that with the Bar Council of India and politicians joining together
to create this new law school, the institution would have difficulty retain-
ing true independence. 290 And relatedly, the new director was also expect-
ed to raise money on behalf of the law school; foreign funders were seen
as one important source to tap. But given his long-held views that educa-
tional reformers in India needed to look inward rather than westward,
Baxi bristled at the thought of soliciting money from institutions such as
Ford, the World Bank, and the like.291
Baxi ultimately withdrew his name from consideration in 1986. The
Bar Council, the Chief Justice, and the Kamataka state government then
turned to Menon, who himself now had some reservations about serving
as director. As Menon recalled: "I was asked to raise the resources,
assemble the faculty, develop a campus with necessary infrastructure,
organize appropriate course of studies and mobilize a student body to
establish what they called the 'Harvard of the East'-in as short a time as
possible!" 292 Many friends and foes alike simply did not believe he was
up to the task; "they laughed contemptuously and advised me against my
such adventure." 293 But after great reflection, and with the support of his
family, Menon decided to accept the offer, and on September 1, 1986 he
became the first director of what would be called the "National Law
School of India." 294
Statutorily, the state of Karnataka established the National Law
School (NLS) in 1986, with the first class entering that following year.2 95
In the months leading up to the opening of the law school, Menon faced
several serious challenges. He had to hire a faculty and administration,
establish a library, raise money, implement a curriculum, and review
289. Author interview with Baxi, March 20, 2004; Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29,
2004. The new law school, remember, was a creation of the state of Karnataka and the Bar
Council of India. Both bodies believed that making the Chief Justice of India the dejure head,
or Chairperson, of the institution would give a great deal of legitimacy to the institution.
290. Author interview with Baxi, March 20, 2004.
291. Id.
292. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 1I.
293. Id.
294. Point of fact, the official name of the law school was entitled: National Law School
of India University. The word "University" was added to the title, because the statutory
"draftsmen of the Karnataka Government felt the word University" must necessarily appear
in the name." See id. at 13. Although no explanation for why this was so is given, it appears
that the historic notion of the role that universities have played in educational life in India
prompted this addition. Moreover, perhaps there was a sense that obtaining funding from the
U.G.C. might be easier if the law school was labeled a 'University' rather than just a law
school.
295. See NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY: PROSPECrUs 2004-2005 at 4. The
act was known as the National Law School of India Act, Karnataka Act 22 of 1986.
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student applications-not to mention find buildings to house classrooms
and dormitories. 296 The Karnataka government eventually provided a
"few dilapidated structures" 297 in the capital city of Bangalore, but
Menon knew that if this experiment were to succeed, the law school need-
ed much better facilities.
Nevertheless, Menon spent late 1986 and early 1987 at this site
focusing on recruiting top academics to his law school. Eschewing the tra-
ditional practice of mainly looking regionally for teachers, Menon con-
ducted an international search. 29 8 He wanted academics with vision:
teachers who had thought seriously about pedagogy and scholars with a
passion to write.299 He required those he hired also to have a deep com-
mitment to clinics and legal aid. After months of reviewing applications,
Menon brought in one hundred fifty-five people for a three-day interview
camp." Menon grilled each applicant individually and in small groups on
whether they had the fortitude to help him with his plans to revamp Indian
legal education. To this day there remain stories of how rigorous this
three-day session was. 300
At the end of the process only eight applicants received offers, with
each one accepting.301 The new independent NLS, now with its nine facul-
ty members (including Menon), had the task of devising a curriculum. To
be sure, Menon did not want to emulate what he considered as the deficient
curricula of other Indian law schools. At the same time, taking the advice
of the Ford consultants and Upendra Baxi, he did not want simply to
mimic foreign models. 302 Although Menon believed in incorporating the
many positive lessons he learned from his visits to American law schools,
he recognized that for his plan to sell it required an Indian character. 303
For six months, Menon and his colleagues labored over the composi-
tion of the cumculum. 304 Finally, in mid-1987 a model curriculum was
completed. (The curriculum today, which is a later incarnation of the
'87 model, is listed in the appendix.) For almost twenty years, Menon had
296. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 14.
297, Id.
298. Id. at 12. Dating back to his first years with the Bar Council of India, Menon
believed that law schools had been too myopic in who they had hired. See Reforming Legal
Education, supra note 242.
299. See both sources, Id.
300. While conducting research for this article, I met faculty who told me that Menon
would spend several hours each of the three days examining and probing into: why the appli-
cants wanted to teach; what their research agenda was; how scholarship informed pedagogy;
what their ideas were for clinics; and so on. The applicants then had to give mock lectures,
provide writing samples, and explain how they would contribute to overhauling the legal
educational process. As stated above, never before had such a rigorous interview process
been associated with law school-teacher hiring.
301. See EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 12.
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theorized about how a solid curriculum for Indian students might look. But
the completion of the 1987 model for the NLS was arguably Menon's
greatest accomplishment to that point. Not only were courses listed, but the
curriculum outlined: how these subjects were to be taught; the expectations
of both students and faculty; and the objectives for each and every class. 305
For example, law at the NLS would be a joint, five-year B.A., LL.B.
program, each year being divided into three trimesters and with students
required to take no fewer than sixty courses in order to graduate.306 (The
number of courses was proportionately far greater than the number offered
at traditional three-year law schools.) Also, no teacher would employ the
pure lecture method. In every course, teachers would encourage student par-
ticipation and emphasize writing, researching, and analysis. Furthermore,
subjects would be taught in an interdisciplinary manner-with a particular
focus on how social science and empirical research intersected with law.307
To promote the idea of serving the needy, all students would be required to
take a series of clinical and legal aid courses. 308 And students would be
evaluated throughout the academic year; examinations would be problem-
based, and unlike how other Indian law schools operated, students would
receive back their tests with comments and could work with professors to
improve their test-taking ability. 309
In addition, Menon institutionalized into the curriculum a mandatory
two-month internship that students would need to complete every year
during their holiday period. In India, most lawyers are solo practitioners
who work as courtroom litigators. 310 For decades the custom was that
after completing law school, a law graduate interested in practicing usual-
ly would take up an apprenticeship with an experienced lawyer who was
working in one of three arenas: a lower level district court; a state High
Court; or the Supreme Court of India. 3t 1 Where that law graduate started
would depend on several factors, including law school performance, geo-
graphic location, personal ambition, connections," and the like.312 But
Menon's view was that if his law graduates could prove to hiring practi-
tioners that they already had serious apprenticeship experience, then
placement rates and placement opportunities would likely be enhanced 313
305. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004; EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION,
supra note 191 at 16-18.
306. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 17.
307. Id. 18.
308. Id.
309. Id- at 17-18.
310. For a discussion of the Indian legal profession, see Galanter and Krishnan, Bread for
the Poor, supra note 157. Also see, Jayanth K. Krishnan, Transgressive Cause Lawyering in
the Developing World: The Case of India, in CAUSE LAYERING VOLUME 3 (eds., Stuart
Scheingold and Austin Sarat, forthcoming 2005).
311. Id.
312. id. And it was common that the court where the law graduate apprentices will be the
court in which she practices as a lawyer until she retires.
313. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
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Of course, finding lawyers to mentor law students might be a challenge;
however Menon figured that since these interns would not be paid
(instead receiving academic credit), their "free" labor would be attractive
to enough practitioners.
And perhaps the most fundamental change Menon sought to make
involved how students would be admitted. Recall that the Ford consul-
tants bemoaned the poor qualifications of the students they observed.
Over the past three decades, various Indian governmental commissions
and academics, including both Baxi and Menon, also had raised concerns
over poor student quality. Recognizing that for the NLS to gain public
legitimacy students had to be "top-notch," 314 Menon instituted a standard-
ized admissions exam, based on the American Law School Admissions
Test, as well as requiring a written essay application and interview.
Only those students who performed well in each part of the admissions
process would be selected; also, the common practice of families bribing
or using personal influence to have their children admitted would not be
tolerated.3 15 Moreover, because Menon capped each class at forty, he
banked on only the best and brightest being selected. 316
All of Menon's work over the years attempting to reform Indian
legal education finally seemed to have come to fruition. But would stu-
dents apply? Was there a demand for this new approach to educating law
students? In the months before the 1987 October semester was to begin,
Menon lobbied various constituencies to sell his NLS program. He sought
support from the Bar Council of India, the Supreme Court, other promi-
nent judges and politicians, and public interest non-governmental organi-
zations. 317 He explained to each of these groups the NLS' mission-how
while it drew upon much of the U.S. law school model to educate stu-
dents, it was fundamentally an Indian institution that sought to bring
social justice for everyday Indians. 318 Through force of personality he
eventually was able to convince these different interests to endorse pub-
licly his endeavor. 319 Menon also successfully lobbied lawyers both in
India and in the U.S. to donate whatever resources they could for his
nascent law library. He worked with a team of architects as well to design
his dream campus that he hoped to build within the next five years.
Finally, he went to the print and television media to promote his reforms
314. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
315. Id. Note, this practice in India was and continues to remain one that pervades many
educational institutions. For a discussion how corruption in this sense and in other ways is
commonplace in India, see See Krishnan, supra note 157.
316. Author intcrview with Menon Feb. 29, 2004.
317. Id. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 19.
318. Id.
319. The term that is used is that the Chief Justice would be the NLS' "Visitor of the
University." Although this would be mainly a formality, because of the authority delegated
to the law school's director, the Chief Justice still would be given the statutory power to
oversee the institution.
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and showcase his vision to the broader public. 320
Through all his hard work, Menon and the NLS eventually received
"over eighty" 32 1 applications. Forty students were selected in this "first
batch,"322 however Menon worried that just because they were chosen did
not mean they would come. To his and his staff's delight, each student
accepted and arrived with great anticipation in October of 1987. (There
was an even split between men and women in the entering class, with nine
of the forty seats reserved for lower castes.323) This first-year group was
everything that Menon wished. They took to the new curriculum with
great passion, and the teachers were as dedicated a faculty as Menon had
ever seen. "It was simply amazing," 324 Menon remarked. Students craved
and received intellectual challenge within the classroom and on their own
would often sponsor academic debates and colloquiums. Teachers like-
wise helped nurture this enthusiasm; in fact with the advice and guidance
of their faculty advisors, a select group of students qualified for the Jessup
International Moot Court competition in the United States.325 By the sec-
ond trimester, NGOs and officials from governmental agencies, who had
visited the campus to observe the faculty, began hiring various teachers as
outside consultants, because of how impressed they were with the quality
of these educators. And by the end of the third trimester-as the buzz sur-
rounding the NLS grew-the faculty had little difficulty helping each of
the forty students find a two-month internship with a practicing lawyer.
326
But even with the success of this first year, Menon also saw that stu-
dents and their families were disheartened over the facilities that housed
the NLS. Menon thus lobbied Indian NGO's, public agencies, and foreign
donors to help fund the construction of his three million dollar architec-
turally designed law school. His perseverance once again paid off. He
received financial commitments from private industries and organizations,
but the biggest donations came from the central government's University
320. Id. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 20. Note, the print media
was the All India Reporter, and the television network was the state of India's Doordarshan
channel. Both outlets provided Menon with their services for free.
321. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 20.
322. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004. The term "batch" is what Indians typi-
cally refer to as "class."
323. Within the Indian constitution, Article 14 (2) allows for the Indian government to set
quotas in governmental jobs and in educational institutions for those caste groups that have
historically been discriminated against within Indian society. There is an important literature
discussing the relevant case law and legalities surrounding this issue. See e.g., SAmE, supra
note 33; OIVER MENDELSOHN AND MARIKA VICZIANY, THE UNTOUCHABLES: SUBORDINATION,
POVERTY AND THE STATE OF MODERN INDIA (1998) MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALTIES
(1984); Clark D. Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste. .. ?
Rethinking Affirmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1999); Clark D. Cunningham,
Lessons on Affinnative Action from India, I THE SUBCONTINENTAL: A JOURNAL OF SOUIH
ASIA AMERICAN POLITICAL IDENTITY 51 (Summer 2003).
324. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
325. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 21.
326. Author interview with Menon, February 29, 2004.
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Grants Commission (which contributed four hundred thousand dollars),
and to many people's surprise, the Ford Foundation. 327 Recall that after
the 1971 Cole report and then Indira Gandhi's suspension of democracy,
Ford decided to shift its focus from institution building and legal educa-
tion to more grassroots initiatives. 328 In the late 1970s and through the
1980s, Ford began funding various "bottom-up" 329 programs, including
organizations that sought to provide legal aid to the needy. However,
Menon was able to convince Ford that a natural extension of its new pri-
orities would be to support the NLS. The NLS and Ford had similar goals,
Menon lobbied, but the law school could not realize its vision working out
of the facilities within which it currently operated. Persuaded by his pitch,
Ford donated eight hundred thousand dollars to NLS, to help it move from
its inner city dwellings to an eighteen acre campus in the village-town of
Nagarbhavi, right outside Bangalore.330
By 1990-just three years after its opening-the NLS relocated to
its new campus. 331 From the donations Menon collected, he could finally
hire a regular full-time staff. (Up until then, faculty members were doing
much of their own administrative and secretarial work.) In terms of aes-
thetics, the Nagarbhavi grounds highlighted Bangalore's reputation for
being the "garden city," as the greenery and flowers surrounding the new
buildings, library, and dormitories were spectacular. 332 NLS prestige also
grew rapidly. Several NLS students won fellowships to do post-LL.B.
studies in England, Australia, and the United States. (Two students even
received Rhodes scholarships.) The President of India and other national
dignitaries spoke at the law school's five-year anniversary. 333 Law profes-
sors from all over the world, including the United States, spent time as
visiting scholars at the NLS.334 And the International Bar Association
funded a continuing legal education professorial chair, while the United
Nations sponsored a refugee law chair. 335
By the mid-1990s, three thousand graduating high school students
327. l; EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 22.
328. Author interview with former Ford-Delhi official, Dr. Carolyn Elliott, April 1, 2004.
329. Id.
330. See id. Also, the money Ford donated also went towards funding a new library and
other academic programs that focused on providing legal aid to the needy. See EXCELLENCE
IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 22.
331. I actually visited this campus in 1991, while doing research for an undergraduate
senior honors thesis, as a student at Ohio State University. I have visited the law school
since then, several times-most recently during March of 2004.
332. Id.
333. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 23.
334. Included among these American scholars were Professors Marc Galanter, Clark
Cunnigham, Ken Gallant, and Frank Bloch. These professors were invited to the NLS both
to teach courses (including clinical courses, with which Cunningham, Bloch, and Gallant
were especially familiar) as well as serve as active members within the law school's commu-
nity. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
335. EXCELLENCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 191 at 24.
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were applying for entrance to NLS.336 Because of the popularity and
respect for the law school, Menon decided to up the entering class size
from forty to eighty. Correspondingly, he hired more faculty members to
maintain a low student-to-teacher ratio. The NLS was thriving, and
throughout this period Menon was hailed as the driving force behind the
law school's success. The NLS was the culmination of decades of plan-
ning and research on how to make Indian legal education an intellectually
worthy enterprise. Many people did not believe that the NLS could
have made it without Menon, and the worry started to set in as to what
would happen once he retired, which by law he had to do upon turning
sixty-two in 1998.
CONCLUSION
As the twentieth century came to a close, the NLS had solidified its
reputation as the leading law school in India. In only about a decade,
Menon had realized his dream-to construct an Indian law school that
would emphasize pedagogy, analytical rigor, clinical training, and public
service. In 1996, Menon asked an independent three-member panel
comprised of one law professor from the U.S., one from England, and one
from Sri Lanka to perform an evaluation of the NLS. 33 7 These foreign aca-
demics were scholars in international and comparative law and were well
familiar with the Indian legal system and Indian legal education. As the
authors of the report conceded, they were astounded by the NLS' accom-
plishments, greatly praising what it had accomplished in so little time.338
In part Menon was successful because he drew on what he consid-
ered to be the best aspects of American legal education; but he did not
believe in the wholesale importation of the U.S. model. Another part of
his planning relied on examining the reports of past Indian law commis-
sions and the proposals from fellow academics in order to create an insti-
tution that could meet the legal needs of Indian students, Indian profes-
sors, and the Indian public. Menon thus proved what the early American
consultants statcd to the Ford Foundation: that Indians could indeed come
up with their own innovative ideas to reform legal education.
In 1998, Menon turned sixty-two years old. Under the law passed by
the Karnataka state government creating the NLS, this was the mandatory
336. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
337. See MARC GALANTER, SAVITRI GOONESEKERE, AND WILLIAM TWNING, REPORT OF THE
EXPERT PANEL ON THE NATIONAlt LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA 1996 (report on file with author).
338. See id. at 36-37 (noting that the NLS serves as a "pace-setter" and that "so success-
ful has it been that it has stimulated expectations and demands that could not possibly be met
by a single institution.") But the panel also made some recommendations as well. If the NLS
were to continue to be the standard-bearer, it needed to, among other things, pay its faculty
higher salaries in order to retain and recruit the very best in teaching. It also needed to
improve its library and staff-size. Then there were other, more general suggestions, includ-
ing clarifying its aspirations for the next five to seven years and fine-tuning the curriculum
to ensure that Menon's goal of wanting to make the law school experience as interdiscipli-
nary as possible would succeed.
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retirement age for sitting directors. 339 Some members of the faculty and
student body started to circulate a petition to ask the legislative assembly
to amend the act to extend the retirement age. However, Menon declared
that he did not wish to continue serving; he was ready to step down, and
he was doing it on his terms. He and his wife also wanted to return to their
home state of Kerala, where much of their extended family remained. 340
In spite of the huge strides made by the NLS in just eleven years,
there were issues that concerned Menon as he departed. A main goal for
Menon in starting an independent law school was to ensure that students
could use their skills to deliver legal services to the needy. But after 1991,
new possibilities-never before offered-presented themselves to
Menon's graduates. During this time, the Indian government opened its
markets to foreign investors. 34 1 Soon, private multinational companies
from the U.S., Europe, and other places came to India. 342 India had offi-
cially entered the globalizing economy.343 Many of these foreign compa-
nies, not surprisingly, sought to lure intellectually attractive graduates to
their businesses. These companies' salaries were exponentially higher
than what Indian practitioners could provide, and with tuition going up
over ten times by 1990 (to cover costs and pay for the school's expan-
sion), 344 for most NLS graduates it was only financially logical to pursue
these exciting (and lucrative) private sector opportunities. 345
But the graduates' shift away from public interest law made some
observers question the NLS' commitment to its original mission. Also,
that the socio-economic status of the student body was increasingly
becoming upper middle class or wealthier-as they were the only groups
who could afford the rising tuition costs-drew criticism from some who
accused the NLS of ignoring the applications of students who came from
populations that the law school purportedly wanted to help. 346 In addition,
while the professors at the school certainly focused on the importance of
pedagogy, scholarly output remained low. With library facilities and other
research resources continuing to be below par, it is understandable that
professors would find it difficult to engage in serious scholarship. Plus,
339. See National Law School of India Act, Karnataka Act of 1986.
340. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
341. The literature in this area is vast. For a selected set of readings, see: BIMAL JAIAN,
THE INDIAN ECONOMY (1993); BIMAL JALAN, INDIA'S ECONOMIC POLICY: PREPARING FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1996); JAGDISIl HHAGWATI, INDIA IN TRANSITION: FREEING




344. Tuition in 1990 was raised to twenty-five thousand rupees; one year prior it was
twenty-five hundred rupees. Today, the annual cost of attending the NLS is one hundred
thousand rupees-which is roughly the medium income for a family of four for one full year.
345. Author interview with Menon, Feb. 29, 2004.
346. Similar to the type of preparatory courses for the American LSAT, so too have such
prep seminars started for the NLS entrance exam. Of course, only those who have the mone-
tary resources to afford such benefits have enrolled.
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because hiring quality faculty remained a challenge, present faculty mem-
bers began taking on more diverse courses, often outside of their areas of
interest in order to meet student demand; inevitably this decreased the
time professors could devote to writing. Yet, a perception started to devel-
op among students and other outside observers that many of these (unpro-
lific) faculty members were not doing their fair share to maintain the
NLS' reputation as an intellectually rich institution.
347
Menon retired in 1998, but these issues have continued to challenge
the NLS. His successor was an internal candidate from within the faculty,
Dr. N.L. Mitra. Mitra served barely two years before succumbing to the
mandatory retirement requirement. 348 Thereafter, Upendra Baxi was once
again nominated for the directorship. Eventually, Baxi's name was
dropped, in part because even some of his supporters conceded that he
was approaching sixty-two years of age.349 In 2000, Dr. Mohan Gopal
was named as Director. Gopal was a student of Menon's at Delhi
University, and Menon publicly supported him for the directorship.
Gopal, who received his S.J.D. from Harvard Law School, was a high-
ranking, senior lawyer for the World Bank as well as an adjunct professor
at Georgetown University. Prior to his tenure at the Bank, he had served
as a law professor at the National University of Singapore. Certain NLS
faculty members, however, were skeptical that because Gopal worked for
the Bank-an institution that they viewed as a neo-colonialist body-that
he could serve effectively as a director.350
As it turned out, Gopal, upon assuming the director's position, argued
for positions that surprised various faculty and student constituencies. In
speeches and in writings, Gopal called on the NLS to begin looking inward
and to cease relying on Western educational paradigms as the basis for
Indian legal education. 35 1 As globalization continued, it was incumbent
upon the NLS, Gopal contended, to find a way of adjusting to the new
347. In my research for this project, academics and lawyers, not affiliated with NLS, as
well as some former NLS students reported their disillusionment with how few eminent
scholars were on the law school's faculty.
348. 1 spoke with officials who stated that Mitra wanted to continue serving as director
and in tact suggested approaching the state legislature to extend the retirement age to sixty-
five. However, because of internal faculty opposition, his idea was not supported. Eventually
Mitra went on to the state of Rajasthan where he currently serves as director of an NLS
progeny, a five-year law school in the city of Jodhpur.
349. See RAM JETHMALANI. BIG EGOS, SMALL MEN (2000)
350. Author interview with faculty members at the NLS, March 3-4, 2004 (identities pro-
tected upon request.) Author interview with six separate law graduates from the NLS, who
were practicing in New Delhi, March 5, 2004. The World Bank in India is seen by various
constituents as the classic rich Western institution that uses money as the proverbial carrot,
in an effort to force the Indian government to adopt to what are perceived as incompatible
Western social, political, and economic policies.
35 I. Id. The author interviewed Gopal on two separate occasions, once on Feb. 29, 2004
and once on March 1, 2004. These sessions took place in Bhopal, India, where Gopal and
the author were attending a conference being sponsored by Menon, where he (Menon) is the
director now of the National Judicial Academy, a national training center for Indian judges.
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changes while retaining its own sense of Indian identity.352 Yet for person-
al, family reasons Gopal voluntarily resigned in early 2003. Since then, Dr.
A. Jayagovind has presided as director. He, like Mitra, was an internal can-
didate and has thus far proved to be a non-controversial leader who has
tried to continue implementing the goals first articulated by Menon. 353
As for Menon, he moved back to Kerala where he planned on living
out a quiet life with his wife. However, less than a year later, the Chief
Minister of the state of West Bengal, 354 Mr. Jyoti Basu, asked Menon to
serve as the director of a new five-year law school modeled after the NLS,
starting in his state's capital city of Calcutta. In 1997 the state of Madhya
Pradesh had opened a five-year law school also based on the NLS model
in its capital, Bhopal. 355 Then in 1998, the state of Andhra Pradesh fol-
lowed suit by creating the National Academy of Legal Studies and
Research (NALSAR), located outside its capital city of Hyderabad.356
And in 1999, Dr. N.L. Mitra, the director who succeeded Menon, left
Bangalore to head-up an NLS prototype in the northern city of
Jodhpur.35 7 West Bengal had a reputation for being one of India's leading
intellectual hubs,358 and Jyoti Basu wanted an NLS-type law school in the
capital to further enhance his state's prestige.
Even during his retirement, Menon was continually pondering how
to improve Indian legal education. 359 With India becoming a bigger play-
er in the globalizing economy, students and lawyers interested in issues of
technology, trade, and international markets realized that they needed to
352. See NEW VISION FOR LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL SCENARIO, Sept.
2001 (study chaired by Dr. Mohan Gopal. This study provided a detailed outline of Gopal's
vision for reforming legal education.)
353. Author-interview with Dr. Jayagovind, March 4, 2004. The director told the author
that he is, in particular, very interested in completing the construction of a new library and
research center, which should be done by the fall of 2004. He also is keen on making all the
classrooms high-tech and providing every student with a laptop computer. Making NLS a
first rate, in terms of computerization and technology, are especially of significance to
Jayagovind.
354. The Chief Minister is the equivalent to what a U.S. state governor would be. The
Chief Minister is the top elected political official in a state in India.
355. This institution was known as the National Law Institute University, and it was cre-
ated by the state legislature through the passage of the National Law Institute University Act
No. 41 of 1997.
356. NALSAR was created by the passage of the Andhra Pradesh Act 34 of 1998. The
state of Andhra Pradesh, and its Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, have been highly sup-
portive of NALSAR. I spent several months-on and off-in 2003 at this campus and
observed how its faculty and staff were passionately committed to becoming the top law
school in India. The facilities are first-rate, surpassing the NLS campus, and its students are
considered as good, if not better than the students at Bangalore.
357. Jodhpur is located in the state of Rajasthan.
358. India's recent Nobel Prize winner in economics, Dr. Amartya Sen is from West
Bengal. And the country's most famous poet, Rabindranathaa Tagore was also from this
state. In addition, the Calcutta High Court, dating back to the time of the British, has been
viewed as one of the leading state courts in the country.
359. Author interview with Menon, February 29, 2004.
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have a firmer footing in intellectual property law. Menon too saw this
trend developing and believed that law schools had to teach their students
how the hard sciences intersected with law. 360 He thus accepted the
Calcutta position, on the condition that the law school would embrace the
NLS model, with the variation that hard sciences-rather than social sci-
ences-would be taught in conjunction with law classes.361 Menon also
agreed to stay in Calcutta only as long as it took to shore-up this program.
By 2003, with the curriculum and reputation of the National University of
Juridical Sciences now firmly in place, Menon stepped down as director.
(Menon's work in Calcutta, in fact, helped spawn another law school in
Raipur, the capital of the state of Chattisgarh, in 2003. This latest institu-
tion has sought to incorporate both hard sciences and social sciences as
integral features of its curriculum. 362)
In 2003, the Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court asked Menon to
serve as the director of a new institution in Bhopal dedicated to the training
of judges who were beginning their careers on the bench. Rather than return-
ing to Kerala, which most observers believed he would do, Menon, after
much thought and consultation with his wife, accepted the new position and
new challenge. No such institution existed in India; the belief held by the
Court and those in Parliament who pushed for creating this National Judicial
Academy (NJA) was that were Indian judges better educated on how to
deliver justice in a more timely and efficient manner, the gridlock that cur-
rently plagues the court system might be alleviated. 363 Elsewhere, scholars
have written on how the backlogs in the Indian courts-considered to be the
worst in the world-have essentially rendered the judicial process useless
for tens of millions of Indians. 364 Believing that Menon's skills and vision to
transform the education of law students could be used now for helping
judges, backers of the NJA turned to him for leadership. (Menon and his
wife moved to Bhopal in late 2003, where they currently reside on the cam-
pus of the NJA.365 Although optimistic, Menon notes that only in time will
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Its official name is Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur.
363. See National Judicial Academy website, http://www.nja.nic.in/.
364. See Krishnan, supra note 157; See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Rights of the New
Untouchables: A Constitutional Analysis of HIV Jurisprudence in India, 25 HuM. RTS. Q
791 (2003); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 157. Also economist Bibek Debroy, has noted:
"Half a million cases in the High Courts have been on hold for 10 years or more, and almost
I million in the lower courts. While the overly long time taken for civil cases to be resolved
can be frustrating to litigants, of much greater concern are cases that involve incarceration.
Two-thirds of the case backlog involves criminal trials. Today, there are 275,000 people in
India's jails; 200,000 of them are waiting for their day in court. Even more distressing, 72%
of the jail population consists of people accused only of petty crimes. Many have been
locked up awaiting trial for longer than the maximum sentence for their alleged crime."
Bibek Debroy, Losing a World Record, FAR E. ECON., Feb. 14, 2002, at 23.
365. In 2004, Menon invited me to Bhopal to give a presentation on the type of education
judges in the United States receive. He sought to inquire whether there might be any useful
lessons the NJA could take from the American system- My talk, given on March 2, 2004,
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we be able to evaluate whether the NJA is a successful institution.)
In sum, this article has sought to trace the historical development of
legal education in post-colonial India. By gaining access to nearly one
thousand pages of previously confidential documents, I have described
how between the 1950s and the early 1970s the Ford Foundation attempted
to export its vision of legal education to India. As its many American con-
sultants who traveled to India reported back to Ford, however, this experi-
ment could not succeed for various institutional, political, cultural, and
legal reasons. But the biggest obstacle, as the Americans noted, was that
any real (and publicly accepted) improvement in Indian legal education
had to come from Indians, not outsiders. Although Indians had worked on
this issue for decades, only after Ford abandoned its work in this area did
substantive reforms-championed by N.R. Madhava Menon in particu-
lar-occur. As we have seen, Menon' s reforms incorporated several of the
suggestions made by the American consultants, but his plans also had a
distinctively Indian character. Today, not including the independent insti-
tutions he established or helped to inspire in Bangalore, Bhopal,
Hyderabad, Jodhpur, Calcutta, and Raipur, there are approximately four-
hundred sixty other law schools in India. 366 That already one-third of these
institutions have converted to Menon's five year model367 just reaffirms
the point made by Ford's American consultants: that Indians indeed have
the skills to improve the quality of legal education in their country.
APPENDIX
The Current Curriculum at the National Law School (2004-2005)
There are three trimesters lasting between July-September; October-
January; and March-July.
First Trimester: Sociology I; Economics I; Legal Methods, Materials &
Processes; Torts I; English and Legal Language
Second Trimester: Economics II; Political Science I; History I; Contracts
I; English & Legal Language (Continued)
Third Trimester Sociology II; Contracts 1I; Constitutional Law I; Torts II;
English and Legal Language (Continued)
Fourth Trimester: History II; Political Science II; Constitutional Law II;
Family Law I
focused mainly on how judges are trained at the National Judicial Center in Reno, Nevada,
as well as how state judges are trained at the National Center for State Courts in
Williamsburg, Virginia. I also spoke about how various law schools and non-governmental
organizations have sponsored judicial training programs (Lecture on file with author).
366. Information obtained from interview author conducted with Menon, February 29,
2004. Although according to Professor Marc Galanter, who is conducting a study on behalf
of the Asia Development Bank, there currently are 544 law schools in India. (Unpublished
report on file with author.)
367. Id.
368- See NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY: PROSPECTUS 2004-2005 at 38-39.
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Fifth Trimester: Jurisprudence 1; Constitutional Law III; Criminal Law 1;
Family Law I1
Sixth Trimester: Criminal Law I; Administrative Law; Property Law;
Political Science III
Seventh Trimester: Criminal Law III (Cr. P.C.); Law of Evidence; Code
of Civil Procedure I; Clinical Course I (ADR)
Eighth Trimester: Code of Civil Procedure II; Corporate Law I;
International Trade Law; Land Law
Ninth Trimester: Drafting, Pleading, & Conveyancing; Corporate Law II;
Human Rights Law; Law, Poverty, and Development
Tenth Trimester: Taxation Law I; International Law I; Jurisprudence II
(Interpretation of Statutes); Intellectual Property Law
Eleventh Trimester: Clinical Course II (Litigation); Banking Law;
International Law II; Labor Law
Twelfth Trimester: Environmental Law; Trust & Equity; Labor Law II;
Insurance Law
Thirteenth Trimester: Conflict of Laws; Optional Seminar I; Optional
Seminar II; Optional Seminar III
Fourteenth Trimester: Taxation Law II; Optional Seminar IV; Optional
Seminar V; Optional Seminar VI
Fifteenth Trimester: Legal Practice (Professional Ethics); Optional
Seminar VII; Optional Seminar VIII; Clinical Course III (Placement)
"All courses carry a uniform course credit of 4 each." 368
